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William Mitchell 
Volume 4 
The Past and -
William Mitchell -1961 
By Allen Lamkin 
From the dawn of civilization to Across the river in Minneapolis, 
the present day man's relationship four more colleges followed in 
with his fellow man has become rapid succession. These were The 
increasingly cc.rerl~x. La-v, which Minneapoils College o::: !.a.;·,,·, Th.:; 
governs this relationship between I Minnesota College of Law, The 
men, has progressed along with this Northwestern College of Law, and 
change in society, and those who the Y.M.C.A., which at that time 
specialize in the law have found offered a legal curriculum. 
that the preparation which was In the late 1920's, The North-
sufficient for the legal profession western College of Law merged 
yesterday will not suffice today. with The Minneapolis College of 
Early American life and society Law, and the Y.M.C.A. law school 
were relatively uncomplex. Its laws merged with The Minnesota Col-
were, by our standards, few and lege of Law. These two schools, 
simple. It was possible in the early The Minneapolis College of Law 
1800's for a young American with and The Minnesota College of Law, 
only a few years of formal educa- existed along with The St. Paul 
tion to read law for two years and College of Law until 1940, when 
acquire a degree at twenty, be- the two colleges in Minneapoils 
come attorney general of his state merged to form The Minneapolis-
at twenty-three, a United States Minnesota College of Law. The 
Representative at twenty-nine, a prime mover in these mergers was 
United States senator a thirty, the decrease in student enrollment 
and a Justice of the Tennessee Su- occasioned by the two World Wars 
preme Court at thirty-one. Andrew and the great depression. 
Jackson, uneducated by our stand- As a result of negotiations which 
ards, went on, in like manner, to began in 1955, the two remaining 
become a Major General at thirty- night law schools were brought to-
five and the seventh President of gether in the final merger which 
the United States. resulted in the establishment of 
As the nation grew older and the William Mitchell College of 
the area became better settled, Law. 
the level and ability of the back- In September, 1958, a new build-
woods lawyer began to rise. A few ing was completed and the two 
day law schools were established, groups, comprising over 400 stu-
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St. Louis Plays Host To 
Student Bar Convention 
By Charles Langer 
I was very fortunate in being able to attend the 13th Annual Meet-
ing of the American Law Student Association from August 5 to Au-
gust 10, 1961, in St. Louis, Missouri, as the voting delegate from the 
Student Bar Association of William Mitchell College of Law. The host 
school was Washington University, and its Student Bar Association, 
The January Inn, acted as the host committee. Highlights of the meet-
ing ranged from an Orientation Workshop to the ALSA "Founders 
Day" luncheon. 
The Orientation Workshop was 
an innovation for annual meetings. 
Here the delegates were intro-
duced to the activities of the 
ALSA. President Dan Batchelor 
presided at the workshop, at which 
the various national ALSA offi-
cers, the members of the Host 
School Committee, and the com-
mittee chairmen were presented to 
the assembled delegates . 
The American Bar Association 
Assembly Session, held in the Civic 
Opera House, Kiel Auditorium, was 
a very interesting and impressive 
function of the ABA. After the 
welcome by Governor John M. 
Dalton of Missouri and the re-
sponse by Judge W. St. John Gar-
ner of Texas, many distinguished 
guests were introduced. Among 
these were Justice Tom Clark of 
the U. S. Supreme Court, the 
Master of the Rolls of England, the 
Pr-,:,~inent of the Canadian Ba.:r As· 
sociation, the President of the In-
ter-American Law Association, and 
cans enjoy today came from 
the Creator and not the State, 
as was evident to our forefa. 
thers when they wrote the 
Declaration of Independence. 
They promised that we would 
defend these rights in what-
ever way necessary. One of the 
ways advocated by Seymour is 
a wider use of international 
law to form a durable and last-
ing peace throughout the 
world. He emphasized that this 
was not an "egghead" concept, 
but is a part of the lawyer's 
duty to help maintain law and 
peace. 
He was of the belief that the 
Soviet Union will not support this 
program until it is forced to do so 
by world opinion. It is our duty to 
help strengthen favorable opinion 
for a strong program of interna-
tional law. for this is the hope of 
weak and underprivileged coun-
our own ALSA President, Dan Three Portias 
Batchelor. All members of ALSA 
tries. The president's last comment 
was that keeping the fortitude and 
steadfastness which our forefathers 
exhibited so well will bring us 
through once more. 
Another interesting and instruc-
tive presentation of the ABA was 
the Conference on Personal Fi-
nance Law, presented by the Ju-
nior Bar Conference, which pro-
duced argument of a legal ques-
tion regarding consumer finance 
important to businessmen and con-
sumers. The counsel selected from 
the Junior Bar Conference by its 
officers were: Attorneys for the 
Plaintiff-Appellee, William R. Co-
gar, of Richmond, Virginia, and C. 
Paul Jones from our own Twin 
Cities. Attorneys for the Defend-
ant-Appellant were Carl W. Niel-
sen, H·artford, Connecticut, and 
John G. Weinmann of New Or-
leans, Louisiana. The Chief Justice 
of the moot Appellate Court was 
Chief Justice Laurance Hyde of 
the Supreme Court of the State 
of Missouri. One of the Associate 
Judges was Fred J. Moreau, Dean 
of the University of Kansas Law 
School. The other Associate Judge 
was Robert G. Storey, Jr., of Dal-
las, Tex2s. 
(Continued On Page 2) 
who were present were recognized. 
The highlight of this ABA open-
ing session was the annual report 
of President Whitney North Sey. 
mour. He first stressed the brother-
hood of the law profession, in-
cluding the lawyer-teacher relation-
ship, the young and the old and 
the judge-practitioner association. 
He emphasized that the most im-
portant thing in our judiciary sys-
tem today is the independent 
Bench and Bar. This greatly dis-
tinguishes the free countries of 
the world from countries domin-
ated by domestic or foreign dicta-
torships. He added that in fact, 
when the Communists first start to 
take over a country, the first thing 
which is eliminated is the inde-
pendence of the Bench and Bar. 
He urged that the one thing which 
every lawyer can do to help pre-
serve our great country is to help 
maintain confidence in the courts. 
Freshmen Begin 
Four-Year 'Terms' 
President Sey,mour also 
stressed that the great rights 
and liberties which we Ameri-
On September 11, 1961, 129 young 
men and women received four year 
sentences in St. Paul. Once again 
the defense, "ignorance of the law," 
proved inadequate. For their com-
mon crime, gross ignorance, they 
are now doing time at William 
Mitchell. A number of those sen-
tenced will receive time off for bad 
behavior. 
To more effectively aid in tl:e 
rehabilitation of this group, so they 
may again take their places as re-
spected members of society, we 
must learn a few facts about them. 
Naval officer, one basketball coach, 
seventeen insurance men, several 
chemists and engineers, and many 
business and banking specialists. 
Representatives of fields related 
to law are one Internal Revenue 
Agent, one U.S. Marshal, two tax 
examiners, tl:ree law clerks, four 
patent trainees, five deputy or as-
sistant clerks of court, and two 
who are employed by the West 
Publishing Company. 
but it was still possible in the dents, were brought together for ~-------------. 
Those sentenced range from 21 
to 47, averaging 26 years of age. 
They come from various parts of 
the continent, from Alabama to 
Manitoba, and from Maine to Ne-
braska. One quarter of those rep-
resented were from outside of 
In the realm of accomplishment 
the group has several notables. 
These include: Harry Sieben, U.S. 
Marshal and former Minnesota 
Highway Safety and Liquor Control 
Commissioner; Ron Johnson, for-
mer Gopher "great" and presently 
assistant basketball coach at the 
University of Minnesota; Com-
mander Arpad Toth, U.S. Navy 
pilot; and Major Richard Chrysler, 
U.S. Air Force. 
early 1900's for a young man to the first time under one roof to 
become a lawyer by passing the attend lectures presented by one 
bar examination after having faculty. The William Mitchell Col-
worked as an apprentice for sev- lege of Law thus became the sec-
eral years under an established I ond largest accredited law school 
lawyer. in the United States having classes 
In the late 1890's a group of exclusively in the evening and the 
lawyers and judges met in St. Paul only night law school in the upper 
to consider the establishment of a midwest. 
night law school. A school of this In 1900, when the first night law 
type would enable those who were school was established in Minne-
unable to attend day law school to sota, the requirement for admis-
acquire a legal education. It was sion was a high school diploma. In 
hoped that the Honorable William 1930 this requirement was raised 
Mitchell, who had recently retired to one year of college work, and by 
from the Minnesota Supreme Court, 1952 the requirement had reached 
could be enlisted as Dean of the three years of college preparation. 
new college. Justice Mitchell, how- Today over ninety per cent of the 
ever, died in August, 1900. The St. students attending the William 
Paul College of Law opened in Mitchell College of Law hold bach-
September of that year. elors' degrees. 
Dean To Continue 
It has been announced by 
Andrew N. Johnson, President 
of the Board of Trustees of 
William Mitchell, that Dean 
Stephen R. Curtis has been 
asked to continue his duties at 
William Mitchell after expira-
tion of the original four year 
contract of 1958. 
In announcing the Dean's ac-
ceptance, President Johnson 
said, "We feel that Dean Curtis 
has been dedicated to the task 
of building William Mitchell 
College of Law into one of the 
important institutions of legal 
learning in the country, and 
we are happy that he is willing 
to continue in that work." 
Minnesota. 
Three young ladies are included 
in the group, two of whom have 
attended institutions outside the 
United States. One of these is an 
English teacl:er and another is a 
receptionist. 
Of the men involved, 60 percent 
are married. Their children number 
from zero to eight. The average 
student has 1.47 children including 
1.3, 0.6, and 1.8 in three cases. 
Educationwise, those incarcerated 
possess excellent backgrounds. 
Ninety-five percent have one or 
more degrees, representing 31 col-
leges and universities. 
Student occupations vary widely. 
They include one CPA, three teach-
ers, three Air Force personnel, one 
Business tycoons included are: 
Aaron White, who became presi-
dent of his own chemical manu-
facturing firm at age 23; and Rob-
ert Hillstrom, who is president and 
general manager of a realty firm. 
Accomplishments in other fields 
were made by Gilbert Richey, Jr., 
who has attended Purdue, Butler, 
and the University of Minnesota 
and who, incidentally, is the father 
of eight cl:ildren. 
May the forthcoming experiences 
be beneficial to those involved, and 
may it be not too much to bear for 
the innocent wives and children of 
those sentenced. 
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The Students Speak -
Challenge To The Bar 
Any discussion these days of "professional responsibility" ends up on 
a note of "let's raise the standards of the bar". Certainly this is an in-
nocuous objective, even if it does state it's own conclusion. But if this 
is a desirable goal it is also a poor place to stop, for as one goes into 
the problem of "how to" achieve it he runs into a plethora of practical 
economic problems which face the legal profession, as a profession, 
today. So what appears to be an item of legal ideals turns out to be a 
facade which hides the real intent and purpose of the statement, which 
is to reduce the numbers in, or coming into, the profession. This intent 
is based in turn on fear that the bar is "overcrowded" and the false 
corrolary that legal incomes suffer because of it. 
We say false because the matter of legal income is a complex col-
lateral issue. It rests in part on the fact that country lawyers are trying 
to live off a "geographic pie" which won't support them very well, 
while the metropolitan lawyer is living off an "economic pie" that will. 
As for the other part, it rests on false economic doctrines which the 
legal profession assumes will do the job; the "toothache" income theory, 
the "collection plate" theory, the "winner take all" adversary system, 
and the penurious disposition of money by governments and business. 
These are the real roots of the laWYers' income and income distribution 
problems, not just simply "overcrowding". 
We fail to see where a reduction in the Hennepin-Ramsey county 
bars would produce more business writing prospectuses in Lake County, 
or vice versa. As for improving legal incomes by improving legal com-
petence, Darrow himself would have trouble getting enough personal 
injury suits against railroads in a good many Minnesota counties to 
make more than a pittance. Perhaps it is all right if the small town 
medical GP goes out of business, along with the small acreage farmer, 
but country laWYers following the same trend are more than removers 
of boils and sowers of wheat: their contributions to communitv ex-
istence cannot be readily or adequately replaced from service · at a 
distant point. A loss here is a total loss to the social roots of our exist-
ence, and the trend here can create only less than "minimum legal 
care" for a significant number of people. 
On this basis, it won't be necessary for the bar to worry about legal 
population or legal income. The law of supply and demand will take 
care of both these problems, until, like the engineers, the onslaught 
will be upon them. Then what is the bar going to do about standards? 
After all, it takes a good many years to make a competent attorney, and 
we can rightfully assume they will be needed to serve the great in-
crease in adult population which will occur in the next ten years, re-
gardless of where these people decide to live. 
But if the general facts point to an actual future "shortage" of 
trained legal personnel, there is a startling lack of ec:"onomic studies 
in depth as to the future needs of the bar. There is in fact no Bureau 
of Legal Economics on the national level set up to do the job, as was 
pointed out by Reginald Smith in the American Bar Journal, Vol. 46, 
p. 483 and p. 1201. This means we do not have so much a problem of 
"raising standards" as creating them, because, until someone puts to-
gether enough statistical information to create a per capita-geographic 
numeric standard, any argument about there being "too many laWYers" 
will have to rest on the scanty information available. And unless this 
is done as a. national effort, the only result we can hope to accomplish 
is a plague of local surpluses and national shortage, the ever-present 
spector of want in the midst of plenty. 
Since we do not have the resources to create such statistical evidence, 
and it is the bar which has asserted the position of "overcrowding", we 
say the burden of proof must rightly and heavily fall on it. We cer-
tainly can't hope to create any realistic standards without such facts 
and we refute the allegation that we can continue to live on testimoniai 
evidence. This is our challenge to the bar. 
ALUMNI ARE REQUESTED 
TO SEND THEIR CORRECT 
ADDRESS TO SCHOOL Of. 
FICE. 
ALUMNI ATTENTION: 
Please send information about 
yourself, or other Alumni, to: 
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Professor Charles E. Nadler, 
who has been visiting professor 
at William Mitchell since 1958, 
was expected to return this fall 
for a full teaching assignment. 
Instead, he was drafted fur an 
unexpected term in a New York 
hospital last summer. He is mak-
ing a full recovery at his home 
in Macon, Georgia, and it is 
hoped he and Mrs. Nadler will 
soon be teading again to the 
north country. 
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f th. come wit a variety of e ucat1onal backgrounds from some of the best 
s u en s ~vai e emse ves O • is colleges and law schools. Everyone who has met these new teachers is 
o~portun~ty to become acquainted sure that the school has taken another sound step in the endless 
with their fellow classmates and process of enriching the instruction of our students. 
faculty members and learn more Our enrollment at the beginning of the semester was again over 
.about the Fraternity. 400. This year the percentage of beginning students who have college 
On November 11 Ramsey Senate degrees is 95, as compared with 90% in recent years. The military 
sponsored an all-school dance build-up that started in the late summer kept a number of men from 
which was held at the University enrolling. The build up has been accomplished, not by increasing the 
Club. Over 100 couples enjoyed drafting of men with no military experience, but by re-activating older 
the melody of the Bill Bright men who have had some active service and are now in the reserves. 
Orchestra and danced to their This has affected an age bracket that involves not only men contemplat-
music from 9 until 1 a.m. ing entering a school such as ours, where the average entering age is 
Starting at 2 o'clock on Novem- 26 or 27 years, but it has also forced several of our upperclassmen to 
ber 11 Delta Theta Phi initiated withdraw from school during this semester. 
approximately 15 new members, The commencement address last June by Judge E. Barret Prettyman 
who had been pledged previously was such a gem that the William Mitchell Opion is taking the unusual 
at an October 31 smoker. After the step in printing it in full. Whether you were present at commencement 
initiation all of the actives of the or not, you will enjoy reading it. 
Fraternity were entertained at a As this is written, we have just been assured of another great 
steak supper served by the Uni- Commencement program for next June 12. Judge Herbert F. 
versity Club. The Senate was Goodrich of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
privileged to have the Honorable Circuit has agreed to be our Commencement speaker. He is a native 
Donald P. Barbeau as guest speak- of Anoka, Minnesota, a graduate of Carleton College and Harvard 
er and Patrick W. Fitzgeral<l, Mast- University Law School, a former member of the law faculties at the 
er of Ceremonies. Universities of Iowa, Michigan and Pennsylvania, and, in addition 
The Senate tentatively plans to 
hold a joint smoker with Mitchell to having served since 1940 as a distinguished federal judge, he has 
for many years been the Director of the American Law Institute. 
Senate of the University of Min-
nesota in December and two smo- Those of you who have not yet heard him speak will be glad to 
kers for members of the Fraternity, know of another of his qualifications. He is a brilliant and witty 
in the spring of 1962. speaker. William Mitchell is appreciative and pround of the high 
caliber of its Commencement speakers. 
Foster Appointed To 
ALSA Committee 
The American Law Student 
Association has announced the 
appointment of Thomas A. Fos-
ter, fourth-year student, to the 
committee on World Peace 
Through Law. 
This committee will work on 
an expansive program during 
the year, giving special atten-
tion to the newly adopted 
foreign student program. 
(Continued From Page 1) 
John Vojtech, President of the 
Canadian Law Student Association, 
was in attendance during the en-
tire meeting. He brought greet-
ings from his association and made 
mention of the ALSA assistance 
given to the Canadian Association. 
He stated that his organization is 
still in its formative years and 
suggested to the delegates that a 
closer contact with Canadian law 
schools be maintained, particularly 
in the fields of debating and moot 
court competition. 
At the Host School breakfast, an 
mteresting and inspiring talk on 
the subject of Defending Unpopu-
lar Causes and Clients was pre-
sented by Morris Shenker, an at-
torney from St. Louis. Mr. Shenker 
had emigrated to St. Louis from 
Russia when he was sixteen years 
old. He attended St. Louis Univer-
sity where he received both his 
B.A. and LL.B. degrees. He has 
served as Judge of the Court of 
Criminal Correction and also lec-
tured at the University of Texas. 
Dean Lesar, of the Washington 
University Law School, when intro-
ducing Mr. Shenker, described him 
as "a man with a heart." 
Shenker stated that criminal law-
yers would never win any populari-
ty contests. He feels it is unfortu-
nate that most attorneys shy away 
from defending unpopular causes 
and clients. Shenker pointed out 
that although it is sometimes hard 
on the individual and even his 
family, he still feels that attorneys 
of America are not performing 
their duties to themselves, their 
bars and the Constitution of the 
United States if they do not en-
gage in this type of work. When 
an accused person is on trial he is 
already at a disadvantage. He has 
been arrested, interrogated and 
The William Mitchell Opinion, which made its first appearance in 
May, 1959, has, in that short span, accomplished so much for the school 
by keeping students, alumni and friends all over the country informed 
and interested in what is going on at the school that we should not be 
surprised when the publication brings us another dividend; but some 
of us have not yet recovered from the excitement of one recent occur-
rence. Last June I received a letter from Howard W. Babcock, an 
alumnus of the class of 1941. Mr. Babcock is United States Attorney 
at Las Vegas, Nevada. He wrote: 
"In the May 1961 William Mitchell Opinion, I note that you have 
a display case in your library for rare law books. 
"While in England during World War II, I purchased a four-
volume set of Blackstone's Commentaries. Volumes I and II were 
published in 1770; Volume Ill, in 1768, and Volume IV, in 1769. 
Volumes Ill and IV are first editions. If you would care to display 
this four-volume work, I would be most pleased to present it to ·my 
alma mater by way of gift. 
"May I hear from you at your pleasure." 
His offer was of course accepted with enthusiasm and appreciation. 
We recently received the four volumes, which are in excellent condi-
tion. Two of the volumes are, indeed, first editions. They make a most 
valued addition to our collection of rare volumes. We welcome this op-
portunity to express the gratitude of the William Mitchell College of 
Law to this generous alumnus. 
Are there other alumni with rare books? 
confined without benefit of counsel. 
Usually, the man is not familiar 
with the legal principles involved; 
he probably hasn't much money 
and consequently many times can-
not obtain "competent" counsel. 
Shenker predicts the time will ar-
rive in the not too distant future 
when large law firms will have ex-
cellent criminal laWYers in the firm 
as well as those specializing in 
such fields as taxation and corpo-
rations. It is not the duty of the 
criminal laWYer to help convict the 
accused. There is no such thing as 
a guilty person until the competent 
person or persons make that deci-
sion, who will be the judge or the 
jury, depending on the circum-
stances. The attorney should never 
pass judgment on his client, and if 
he does, he is denying his client 
rights under the Constitution of the 
United State. Shenker emphasized 
that even though an attorney's 
family may suffer, it is his duty as 
a laWYer to accept this type of em-
ployment. If he does not, there will 
be a real breakdown of law en-
forcement. 
The professional seminar in 
"Medical Malpractice in Today's 
Society" provided a distinguished 
panel, which explored the various 
facets of this most important inter-
professional area. 
The Association has grown from 
46 Charter Member student bar 
associations to 130 member asso-
ciations in twelve short years. The 
highhght of the business of the 
meeting was the adoption of the 
indvidual law student membership 
proposal of the ALSA Board of 
Governors. The newly-elected 
Board of Governors was charged 
with the responsibility and duty 
of implementing the individual law 
student membership program in 
1962. The adoption of the indi-
vidual membership proposal 
amounted to a great change in 
purpose of the Association - go-
ing from an association whose 
membership was limited to school 
student bar associations to an asso-
ciation made up of individual law 
students as well as student bar 
associations. It is expected that 
many more advantages will accrue 
to the individual law student as a 
result of this change in purpose 
of the ALSA, thereby adding to 
the professional growth of each 
individual member. 
It is my sincere recommenda-
tion that more delegates from each 
member law school be permitted 
to attend the 1962 annual meeting 
to be held in San Francisco next 
August, and future annual meet-
ings. The quality of the national 
organization, the caliber of the 
delegates, and the hard work in-
volved in preparing seminars, 
workshops, and discussion groups 
cannot but help inspire the dele-
gates and members with regard to 
the fine work and purpose of the 
American Law Student Association. 
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THE LAW 
By Hon. E. Barrett Prettyman 
Following is the address in full which was presented at the 1961 
William Mitchell commencement exercises by the Hon. E. Barrett 
Prettyman, one of the Judges of the District Court for the District 
of Columbia. 
President Johnson, Dean Curtis, Ladies and Gentlemen: 
I am both honored and happy at being here. Of course the extreme 
honor and pleasure is in tte degree you have announced you will confer 
upon me. That is a precious possession I shall cherish always. Then I am 
honored and made happy by the distinction of the group who invited 
me. There were several collaborators - Judge Sanborn, Judge Burger, 
Judge Blackmun, President Johnson, Dean Curtis, Mr. Lee Slater of the 
West Publishing Company and Mr. Wayne Davies who is tte official 
reporter for our court. I must mention especially Judge Warren Burger, 
who now sits with me on the court and who is an alumnus of this school. 
I have developed respect, admiration, and a vast affection for him. We 
disagree, but I dislike people who always agree; I like men who are 
belligerently in error upon occasion. In the second place I am glad to be 
here because you are a night school. I tacked out my law degree in a 
night school. I taught public school in the daytime, assisted in coaching 
athletic teams in the afternoon, and traveled an hour each way every 
evening to get that precious parchment. The day sctool boys un-
doubtedly have more chance to learn the law, and so I suppose they 
really do learn more than we did; but one thing I assert - those of us 
to whom each evening's lectures and quizzes were an agony of accom-
plishment, prized more highly each morsel of instruction ttat was 
offered us, each sub-item of the law that was unveiled to us, each hour 
that moved us closer to membership at the bar. Of course the boys who 
must earn their living while taking daytime courses stare this glorious 
sense with us. But, however much we share it, it is still ours and I, for 
one, glory in it. One thing about your Bulletin puzzled me. What on 
earth did you do with Wednesday evenings? Georgetown made us attend 
all five evenings. And in the last place I am happy to be here because, 
while your school is named for your great Justice William Mitchell, 
wt.om of course I did not know as a younger lawyer, I watched his son 
from a distance during his tour of duty in Washington. He ranked in my 
book with the greatest at the bar of these times - John W. Davis, New-
ton D. Baker, Charles Evans Hughes, Herbert Pope. I thank you from 
the bottom of my heart for letting me be here. 
I submit as my subject "The Law 
-As I See It." I shall submit sev-
eral propositions, principally two. 
The first is an affirmation. Tt.e law, 
as I see it, is a science, a part of 
the science of human relationships. 
Now, before you reject that propo-
sition as obviously absurd, permit 
me to develop it. Let us look first 
at some of the characteristics of 
science· and then at the law. The 
first and basic characteristic of 
science is that it is a search for 
truth. Sometimes it is said that 
science is truth, but ttat is merely 
a pleasant arrogance of lesser sci-
entists. The dictionaries say science 
is systemized knowledge, but 
"knowledge" in that definition in-
cludes opinion and theory as well 
as certainty. Much of accepted 
scientific fact is false. Science as 
the real scientists know, is basi-
cally a search for truth. What is 
currently called scientific fact is 
really no more than the best belief 
of the moment. Much of it is not 
really true because the scientists 
have not yet learned the truth as 
to so very many matters. Illustra-
tions troop to mind. In 1490 the 
scientific fact was that the earth is 
flat; Columbus was a scientific ec-
centric. Fifty years ago the chem-
istry books taught ttere are ninety-
two irreducible species of matter, 
called elements. The present no-
tion, as you all know, is that all 
matter is composed of electric 
charges and the various species of 
matter are merely varieties of num-
ber and arrangement of the charges 
in atoms. Until very recent years 
medical authorities, including the 
pharmacopoeias, said that nicotinic 
acid is deadly poison. But today it 
is recognized as one of the vitamins 
and we take a bit every day. Physi-
cians bled President George Wash-
ington with leeches. One of tte 
charges against General Billy 
Mitchell (no kin to your William 
Mitchell, I believe) for which he 
was court-martialed was that he at-
tempted to foist upon the Army 
the fantastic notion that man might 
fly faster than sound. So we migtt 
go on indefinitely. Scientific knowl-
edge consists of currently accepted 
scientific fact and theory. n is the 
best we know to date, but some of 
it is true and some of it is not true. 
Science is the search for thiµ which 
is true. 
The next characteristic I note is 
that some scientific facts are dis-
covered and some are created by 
man. Electricity was discovered, 
but the generation of electricity by 
a whirling armature in a magnetic 
field and the conduction of the 
energy by copper wire to a light 
bulb are scientific facts wtich were 
invented by man. The facts of na-
ture have existed from the creation 
of the earth. The raw material for 
radio waves existed in the time of 
the Babylonian Empire, and so did 
the natural phenomena which sup-
port an airplane. Penicillin has al-
ways existed. But of course such 
facts do not become part of science 
until they are discovered. Science 
takes eitter or both of two courses, 
the discovery of natural truth or 
the production of new facts. 
Scientists in their daily work 
must do the best they can with 
what they know, even though they 
realize the imperfections of their 
knowledge. For example, engineers 
building airplanes must do the best 
ttey can with what they know. 
They would like very much to land 
the plane straight down, or start it 
straight up, or have it hover mo-
tionless, but they do not as yet 
know how, except to the limited 
capacity of the present design of a 
helicopter and of dirigibles. Zoolo-
gists would like very much to elim-
inate Japanese Beetles and the 
Mexican Bean Bugs, but they do not 
as yet know how. So they must do 
the best they can with poisons in 
limited areas, quarantines, inspec-
tions and other makeshifts, the best 
they know. The medicoes are fran-
tic to stop, destroy, eradicate can-
cer, but they do not know how. So 
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they do the best they can with 
surgery and x-rays and some drugs. 
Thus it is quite clear that the 
present wto1e of every science con-
sists of two parts, (1) the applica-
tion to daily problems of that which 
is the best presently known on the 
subject and (2) the never-ceasing 
search for answers not yet known. 
The never-ceasing search for new 
answers to old problems has two 
striking characteristics in the scien-
tific world. One is the persistence 
of the search, and tte other is the 
reluctant caution with which a new 
discovery or invention is accepted. 
Our friends, the doctors, are ever 
pressing for new cures, but they 
are just as skeptical about adopt-
ing a new discovery as they are 
keen about making it. Engineers 
and physicists are always seeking 
solutions to the problems of air 
flight, but their every discovery 
and invention, no matter how 
eagerly hailed, is subjected to long 
grueling tests before it is offered 
for use. The scientific way of ac-
cepting a new answer is to try it 
out experimentally until it has 
been proven. Tt.is balance between 
zealous searching for the new and 
caution in its adoption is a char-
acteristic of the truly scientific 
method. 
Now, let us look at the law, its 
characteristics and its difficulties. 
The law deals with human rela-
tionships. These are many and var-
ied. There are the relationships 
between man and man, between 
man and woman, among groups of 
people, the family, partnerstips, 
corporations, and finally govern-
ments, small and great. They re-
volve about people and property, 
actions and events. They involve 
an infinite variety of facts. They 
are utterly simple and unutterably 
complex. These relationships must 
be arranged and controlled, lest 
chaos be complete. To that end 
there must be rules. Those rules 
are the law. The law consists of a 
body of rules which govern re-
lationships. 
The difficulties and problems of 
tte law are pretty much the same 
as those of other sciences. We know 
quite a bit, but we know that we 
do not know so much more. We 
have discovered true answers to 
many problems. Thievery and mur-
der are certainly wrong. We know 
that unfettered power of any sort 
is dangerous and we seek to pre-
vent it. We know that for nations 
to settle their differences of opin-
ion or of interest by slaughtering 
their prime specimens of physical 
and mental excellence is obviously 
an incorrect rule, but we do not 
seem to be able to establish a co~-
rect rule. We do pretty well in 
many areas but not very well in 
others. We know full well that we 
do not know the answers to many 
of our problems. Tte prevention of 
crime, the control of commerce, the 
distribution of goods, as, for ex-
ample of food, the ownership of 
property, the problems of the 
juvenile, the indigent, the incompe-
tent are unsolved problems. The 
rules of the air and of space and of 
atomic energy are not yet discov-
ered. We know that fifty different 
sets of rules in one nation for the 
relationship of husband and wife is 
a wrong system. The list of our un-
solved problems is well-nigh limit-
less. And we know it. 
As is tte case with most other 
sciences, the law is in part dis-
covered and in part invented. There 
are in the law, as I see it, certain 
natural rules. Many basic rights 
are natural; many moral strictures 
are natural. This is a moral world, 
as I see it. Man discovers those 
rules. Other laws are invented, and 
this list is long. Corporations, cur-
rency, rules of the road, and so on 
indefinitely. We discover in part 
and we invent in part. 
That law is a science, that is, in 
basic part a search for truth, pre-
supposes, of course, that there are 
true and correct ultimate solutions 
to .the problems of tuman relation-
ships. Of that I am firmly con-
vinced. My own belief is that man 
was created by an Intelligence, but 
even if that were not so, I would 
still believe that animal-man can 
live in a state of maximum well-
being, that that state is definable, 
that man desires to achieve it, and 
that it is achievable. I do not be-
lieve that the human race is con-
demned forever to an existence of 
disturbance, fear, oppression, eco-
nomic want, injustice. There are 
true and correct ultimate solutions 
to tte problems of human relation-
ships. 
Thus, as I see it, an important 
basic part of the practice, the teach-
ing, and the administration of the 
law is a search for better answers. 
The law is not merely that which 
has been established. The corpora-
tion, monogamy, and due process 
of law once were new. Something 
new tas been added to the law 
from time to time, because the 
seeking mind of man discovered or 
invented a better rule for the serv-
ice of man's well-being. That proc-
ess has not ceased. The mind of 
man has not atrophied. Quite the 
contrary, more and more men, 
more and more actively, more and 
more intelligently, are seeking an-
swers to the problems in this vast 
labyrinth. 
I interject that the adoption of 
that which is newly discovered or 
invented in the law should be with 
the same caution as that with which 
scientists in other fields accept the 
new. The adoption of a new solu-
tion after rights have accrued fre-
quently involves a denial of a right 
already established, but an estab-
lished rule may in the course of 
the years, by the occurrence of 
events and ctange of customs, etc., 
become an instrument of injustice 
rather than of justice. This capacity 
for change is one of the proud 
features of our common law sys-
tem. My point here is that keen 
search for the new and better and 
extreme caution in adopting the 
new are not inconsistent. Together 
they constitute the truly scientific 
process; in the law as in every 
other science. 
Of course, the most important 
part of practice and administra-
tion of tte law, time-wise and 
money-wise, is the daily application 
of the best we currently know. But 
that is not a Univac operation. A 
robot cannot practice law any more 
than it can practice medicine or 
build houses. The day-by-day prac-
tice, and also the administration, of 
the law consists of reaching live 
solutions to living problems. Cases 
are not quiz program questions the 
answers to which are in a book 
somewhere. They are problems, 
mostly having to do with tte re-
lationships of human beings. A di-
vorce is not a compendium of pla-
giarized papers and stereotyped 
pronouncements. It is a complex 
problem of human relationships, 
the intricacies .of human behavior, 
the requirements of a pressing so-
ciety, the future of children, etc., 
etc. A will is not a jumble of un-
intelligible Seventeenth Century 
obscurities taken from a book. A 
will is usually the climactic act of 
a person's whole lifetime effort. 
The drawing of tte simplest will, 
properly approached, is a problem 
in human relationships of the most 
intricate and delicate sort. A man 
wants to leave all his property to 
his wife. A flood of questions is 
unloosed by that simple idea, if 
the lawyer is the scientist he ought 
to be. The fact is that the careless-
ness· with wtich many lawyers per-
mit hard-working, thrifty people 
to toss out the window, or into the 
outstretched hands of unscrupulous 
volunteers posing as advisers or 
investors, or into the maw of con-
suming litigation, the sweatstained 
savings of a lifetime is appalling. 
An architect who drew plans for a 
building with care proportionate to 
the sad process of many lawyers 
drawing wills would be barred from 
practice long before he starved to 
death or was prosecuted. The same 
is true in respect to tte drawing of 
contracts, the trial of lawsuits, and 
the argument of cases. The work 
of a lawyer is a series of problems, 
no two exactly alike, which con-
cern the relationships of human 
beings, some simple and some baf-
flingly complex. 
We could go on with other com-
mon features of the systems known 
as sciences and the system of the 
law. The thesis I submit to you is 
that tte law is not dead; it is alive. 
The law is no more dead than is 
physics, or chemistry, or astrono-
my, or geology, or biology. The law 
is not an ancient language like 
classic Greek, the conjugation of 
the improper verbs of which is to 
be learned by rote and repeated 
parrot-like in answers to questions. 
It is not even a delightful litera-
ture of the past to be read for in-
terest and studied for style. The 
law is the process of dealing with 
actual, present, live problems of 
human beings and tt.eir activities. 
Full comprehension of the law is 
not acquired by memory; the law 
requires the application of active, 
living intelligence to the raw ma-
terial of people and events. 
The whole of the law is the 
whole of the truth as to human 
relationships. Thus, tt.e whole of 
the law consists of two parts. One 
is the daily application of the best 
that is known to date; and the 
other, equally important, part is 
the unremitting search for new 
and better answers. The lawyer, 
the law teacher and the judge are 
under two obligations. One is to 
apply daily tt.e best we know to 
date. The other and equal duty is 
to search unceasingly for better 
answers than we now know. Both 
are living processes. 
And now I come to another phase 
of my subject. We have an expres-
sion of which we are very fond and 
very proud. It is "government by 
law." What does that mean, as I 
see it? A law is a rule. The Oxford 
Dictionary says Law means "The 
body of rules, whetter proceeding 
from formal enactment or from 
custom, which a particular state or 
community recognizes as binding 
on its members or subjects." Then 
"government by law" means gov-
ernment by rules. It means we 
formulate and adopt rules and then 
govern by applying those rules. As 
the Dictionary definition indicates, 
sometimes rules are made by a law-
making body created for that pur-
pose. Sometimes they are made by 
our common-law system, which 
means that a given rule has for so 
long and so often appealed to the 
sense of right and justice of many 
people tl:at it becomes established 
as a rule of law, and is so declared 
by the judges. 
(Continued On Page 4) 
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Once a rule is made, the duty of 
executive officers and of judicial 
officers in our system is to carry 
out that rule. They have no other 
duty or authority. You may some-
times hear the term "judicial dis-
cretion." Chief Justice John Mar-
shall said many years ago: "Judi-
cial power, as contradistinguished 
from the power of the laws, tas no 
existence. Courts are the mere in-
struments of the law, and can will 
nothing. When they are said to 
exercise a discretion, it is a mere 
legal discretion, a discretion to be 
exercised in discerning the course 
prescribed by law; and, when that 
is discerned, it is the duty of the 
Court to follow it. Judicial power 
is never exercised for the purpose 
of giving effect to the will of the 
Judge; always for tte purpose of 
giving effect to the will of the 
Legislature; or, in other words, to 
the will of the law." 1 
This system of ours is in direct 
antithesis to another system in 
vogue in some places on the earth, 
and sometimes discussed approv-
ingly and even sometimes followed 
in this country. That theory is that 
a judge, having a dispute before 
t.im for decision, ought to do what-
ever seems to him just and right 
and pr.oper at the moment. I con-
fidently assert to you that such is 
not our system. 
Let me try to make plain the 
matter as I see it. Of course, if all 
men who come to the bench were 
wise, independent, impartial and 
without causes or predilections, it 
might be well to leave all disputes 
to their unfettered fiat. But not all 
judges are so. Our ancestors long 
ago decided it best to have rules, 
and to bind all government officers 
by those rules. If you think about 
it - put yourselves in tte frame of 
mind of the barons before Run-
nymede for instance, or of the men 
who gathered at Philadelphia and 
made a written Constitution, - you 
will agree with that decision. In 
the next place, in our concept of 
things human beings have rights -
endowed with inalienable rights, 
our forefathers said. Such rights 
are part of our natural law; the 
Bill of Rights reminds the federal 
government it must not impinge 
upon them. Those basic rights are 
rules; and moreover, they can be 
enforced only if there are binding 
rules requiring their enforcement. 
If a court could uphold your free-
1 Osborn v. Bank of the United 
States, 22U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 
(1824). 
dom of speech or not, as it pleased, 
you would have no freedom of 
speech. Our courts are bound by 
rules to uphold your rights. Witt.-
out rules there are no rights. 
Next let us note that in every 
controversy there are at least two 
parties, adversaries, usually active, 
sometimes merely potential but 
nevertheless real. In a civil action 
there are plaintiff and defendant. 
In a criminal case there are the 
accused and the state, the people. 
Justice, as I see it, is the balance 
of right as between the two sides. 
It is not the service of tte interest 
or the benefit of either one side or 
the other. In our system the justice 
of a given situation is predeter-
mined objectively by a rule. When 
thereafter a factual situation arises 
justice is done by applying the 
rule. Justice is not done by ad hoc 
evaluation of personalities, circum-
stances or emotions. 
People sometimes use the word 
"justice" to mean gentleness, 
mercy, a benign consideration. 
Here we must note a difference 
between the justice which may be 
embodied in a rule of law itself 
and the justice involved in the ad-
ministration of fr.at law. In mak-
ing a rule the law-makers may well, 
and frequently do, incorporate dis-
tinctions of age, economic condi-
tion, citizenship, sex and many 
other circumstances. They often 
put in a law a degree of flexibility. 
They may be merciful, benign, 
gentle. But in our system, the ad-
ministration of the law is a differ-
ent matter altogether. At this stage, 
the law, whatever it is, governs. 
Justice at this stage is the applica-
tion of the rule. This justice is 
cold, utterly objective, impartial, 
impervious to emotion. It is the 
same for ricl:. and poor, old and 
young, male and female, white and 
colored. The law itself may obtain 
distinctions. But the administrators 
of the law, be they executive offi-
cials or judges, can make none. 
When we say "administration of 
justice" we really mean, as Chief 
Justice Marshall pointed out, the 
application of the law. 
Thus it is that the results of the 
administration of justice in our 
system is frequently harsh indeed 
to one party or tte other. If a will 
is neither holograph nor witnessed, 
it is invalid no matter what the fi-
nancial plight of its beneficiaries. 
A plaintiff in a civil action for 
damages arising from an automo-
bile collision must prove negli-
gence; and, if he cannot, he cannot 
recover no matter how morally 
certain it may be his opponent was 
at fault. A plaintiff who neglects to 
bring his action within the statu-
tory period loses. And so on into 
more complicated fields . 
A reference to baseball may illus-
trate the point. That a man gets 
tl:.ree strikes and no more and that 
a fly ball which lands outside cer-
tain lines is foul are fixed by rules. 
The umpire applies the rules. He 
does not say, "Well, this batter is 
a little fellow and a rookie, and 
that pitcher is a veteran and rich 
and mean. I'll call this next one a 
ball whether or no." What is harsh 
for the batter is good for the 
pitcter, and contrariwise. The ump 
pays no attention to that. He gov-
erns according to the rules exactly 
as they are written. The justice of 
the situation is written in the rule 
itself. This is what we mean by 
government by law. 
This basic doctrine applies to 
judges in all phases of judicial 
duty - whether deciding a case, 
ruling on evidence, instructing a 
jury, acting on petitions or mo-
tions, or voting on appeals. Absent 
flexibility in the applicable law, a 
judge has no power to try to do 
what he l:.appens to think is best 
or better for one or the other of 
the two opposing sides before him. 
If a law is not just, the law itself 
should be changed. Of course, a 
judge may have difficulty in decid-
ing what the law on a given point 
is and judges may, and do, disagree 
on that. But once the applicable 
rule of law is ascertained, it must 
be applied. To that end, among 
others, we l:ave Appellate Courts. 
Quite frequently the application 
of a rule to a given situation cannot 
be justified by rationalization. Thus, 
if a rule requires a given act to be 
done within thirty days, it is im-
possible to justify by reasoning 
alone the invalidity of the act if 
done within thirty-one days. If a 
rule says a person cannot vote until 
he has passed his twenty-first birth-
day, it is impossible to justify a 
refusal to permit him to vote at 
twenty years and ten months of 
age. You cannot rationalize a rule 
that if tte first baseman's foot is 
on the bag the runner is out, but if 
the foot is one inch off the bag the 
runner is safe. Whenever you at-
tempt to rationalize a rule in re-
spect to a given factual situation, 
you are likely to be in trouble. 
Judge Learned Hand relates an 
incident concerning Mr. Justice 
Holmes 2 which is pertinent here. 
• THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, 306-
307 (3d ed. 1960) . 
The great Yankee from Olympus 
said, as we all know, "I hate jus-
tice." What he meant, Judge Hand 
opines, was illustrated by this story. 
Tte two drove down to the Su-
preme Court Building one day. As 
they parted, Justice Holmes to go 
in to a conference of the court, 
Judge Hand said, "Well, sir, good-
bye. Do justice!" Holmes replied 
emphatically, "That is not my job. 
My job is to play the game acccord-
ing to the rules." 
One other related phase of this 
subject I must mention. You fre-
quently see tabulations, or score0 
cards, on judges in respect to vari-
ous causes or social doctrines. 
Judge so-and-so voted so many 
times last year pro-labor or pro-
criminal or antiseivil rights or pro-
poor man and so on. As I see it, 
such tabluations are grossly insult-
ing or ought to be. As I see it, a 
poor man is just as likely to be 
wrong on a point of law as is a 
rich man; and conversely a billion-
dollar corporation is as likely to be 
wrong on a point of law as is its 
indigent opponent. Neither a labor 
union nor a trade association, bril-
liant thougt their counsel may be 
(as indeed they usually are) is in-
variably correct in its legal posi-
tions. Indeed I doubt if they ought 
to be; they have causes and inter-
ests to advocate and protect. But 
the administration of the law knows 
no causes or interests, or ought not 
to. My own notion on this business 
of statistical evaluations of judges 
by causes or interests is so strong 
that I really believe they are sub-
versive of the administration of 
justice. 
The body of the law stould be 
just. The established processes of 
the law should be just. But the ad-
ministration, the application, of the 
body of the law and its processes 
must be according to the prescrip-
tions of the law and not according 
to a court's criteria of justice apart 
from the rules. 
Why all this on your graduation 
nigtt? Because I would have you, 
as you enter our great profession, 
believe as I do, that the law is a 
living process, not a sarcophagus 
of mummies, and that "government 
by law" is not a tasteless, odorless, 
colorless, powerless cliche, but is a 
concept of government which is 
meaningful, definite, strict, right, 
frequently harsh, designed for 
strong free men, not for serfs or 
the subservient, the best of all sys-
tems in the long run. I would, if I 
could, prevent your straying off 
into marshes and quicksands drawn 
by the lure of will-o'-the-wisp 
sirens, whispering abstract justice 
ofaw Wivej Gnterlain al Annual Parl'J-
By Beverly Rosenthal 
The William Mitchell Law Wives 
organization began its third year 
of operation with a party at the 
school on September 27, to wel-
come all freshman wives and wives 
of transfer students. Seventy three 
wives out of a potential 82 at-
tended. Dean Stephen R. Curtis ex-
plained the purpose of the group 
is "to improve the understanding 
of the members of this organiza-
tion, as wives of law students, of 
the problems, ambitions, standards, 
and responsibilities .of law stu-
dents and of lawyers, to be of as-
sistance in every possible way to 
the students and to the law school 
and to promote social fellowship 
among the William Mitchell Law 
Wives." The speaker, Mrs. Phyllis 
Jones, 1960 alumna, described the 
new experiences in law facing the 
students and advised the wives as 
to how they can best help their 
husbands achieve success in this 
field. Chairman of the party, Mrs. 
Donald Hassenstab, chose the 
school colors, purple and light 
blue, to decorate the serving ta-
bles. 
The first regular meeting of the 
club was held October 4, at the 
school. Mrs. Hilton Mason gave an 
inspiring talk entitled, "Lady and 
The Law". Mrs. Mason is a prac-
ticing attorney, mother of law stu-
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disembodied from rules. That 
ghostly shadow is not our system. 
Now may I mention some less 
abstruse features of the law as I 
see it. I ask myself some questions 
and briefly answer them. I shall 
not dwell upon them. 
Question One: How does one 
succeed at the law? Answer: By 
work. There is no other road to 
success at the law. Sad though it 
be, tte fact is that the vast major-
ity of young lawyers do not and 
will not work; hence many young 
lawyers do not succeed. What do I 
mean by work? I mean a grinding 
persistence which knows no limits 
of time or strength or energy. I 
mean effort outside the require-
ments of one's normal employ-
ment. I mean, for example: Learn 
to write. Learn to write a sentence 
in English which can be understood 
and cannot be misunderstood. Can 
you write such a sentence? Do you 
happen to realize the vastness of 
the amount of litigation which con-
cerns only the question of wl:at 
somebody meant when he wrote 
something? Statutes, appellate 
court opinions, contracts, especially 
insurance policies, wills, rules and 
regulations. Learn to speak. This is 
an art acquired only by hard work. 
The gift of gab is a great handicap 
to a young lawyer. It sounds well, 
but an ebullient orator at a nego-
tiation table or at an appellate 
court lectern, is a sad and useless 
spectacle. Learn to probe the facts 
- not just ascertain them. Learn 
to exhaust the authorities - not 
just find them, or some of them, 
but exhaust them. 
Question Two: Is competition 
tough in the practice of the law? 
Answer: In tl:e first few years, yes_ 
But if you are a good lawyer the 
competition gets less and less as 
the years go on. 
Question Three: How does one 
get clients? Answer: The first 
clients come by accident, or by in-
heritance, or by marriage, or by 
way of a firm to which one is at-
tached. After that clients come 
from satisfied clients. The secret to 
a clientele is a good job well done. 
Question Four: What is the 
lawyer's greatest art? Answer: Un-
doubtedly it is clarity. Clear think-
ing, clear writing, clear speaking. 
Question Five: What ability of a 
lawyer pays the higtest? Answer: 
As in every other profession or 
business the highest pay goes to 
those who have the ability to make 
correct decisions. When I was 
young I was told the way to be-
come wealthy was to get a client 
who was old and rich and scared. 
But a life-time of observation has 
(Continued On Page 8) 
dent James Mason and a grand 
spokeswoman for law and life. 
Judge Thomas Tallakson, Dis-
trict Court of Hennepin County, 
Juvenile Division, spoke on "Trou-
bled Youth of Our Time," at the 
November 1 meeting. On Decem-
ber 6, Mr. Glenn, Twin Cities flor-
ist, presented a program on Christ-
mas decorations. Wives of Alumni 
are welcome and encouraged to 
attend the meetings. 
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Right To Sue For Prenatal Injury Upheld 
By Donald F. Zibell 
Fourth year student, William, Mitchell College of Law; Public 
Accountant, Bon,lay, Anderson, Waldo and Co.; B.A. degree, Uni-
versity of Minnesota. 
I 
tion.14 California was the only ex-
ception 15 and its decision came 
I with the aid of a statute which 
Early Law 
This discussion deals with the 
right of an infant to sue for pre-
natal injuries sustained while non-
viable in its mother's womb. Until 
recently the unanimous rule of law 
has been that an infant could not 
maintain an action for injuries re-
ceived before birth.1 In fact, a 1945 
treatise states the rule as follows: 
"At common law and in the ab-
sence of a statute to the contrary, 
an infant has no right of action for 
injuries sustained by him while en 
ventre sa mere." 2 
Representative of the growing 
line of cases that has almost com-
pletely reversed this rule within 
the short span of fifteen years is 
Sinkler v. Kneale.3 The plaintiff 
in the Sinkler case was allegedly 
born Mongoloid as the result of in-
juries received in an automobile 
collision. The car driven by the in-
fant's mother was, according to the 
complaint, negligently struck in 
the rear by the defendant's car. 
This resulted in injuries to the 
mother one month after concep-
tion of the infant plaintiff. 
Relying on an earlier decision,4 
the Pennsylvania Common Pleas 
Court sustained defendant's objec-
tions to the complaint and entered 
judgment for the defendant, hold-
ing that the infant had no cause of 
action. On appeal to the State Su-
preme Court the decision was re-
versed and remanded. An infant 
may recover in tort for injuries 
sustained before it was viable.5 In 
reversing its previous holding in 
the Berlin case the court relied 
heavily on the current state of 
medical knowledge that a child is 
in separate existence from the mo-
ment of conception, and is not 
merely a part of its mother's body. 
The court reviewed the status of 
the law in other states and con-
cluded that the current trend in 
this country is toward allowing re-
covery for prenatal injuries. Ac-
cording to the compilation in the 
case, eighteen states allow recovery, 
four deny it, and another four in-
dicate recovery may be possible 
under certain circumstances, but 
presently deny it. 6 
Bell Dissents 
In a dissenting opinion,1 Justice 
Bell felt compelled by the doctrine 
of stare decisis to follow the pre-
vious decision since he did not be-
lieve there had been any recent 
developments in medicine to justify 
a change in the law. Justice Bell 
foresaw adverse effects in allowing 
the suit since he believed the next 
step would be to allow the child to 
sue the mother, the doctor, or any-
one else for any failure to use due 
care before birth, thus causing 
increased litigation and greater 
family discord. Furthermore, the 
1. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of N orth-
ampton. 138 Mass. 14, 62' Am. Ret1. 242 
(Sup. JucL Ct. 188-t). 
2, 43 C.J.S. ln/CIIl•la §104 (1946). 
However, th.a 1961 pocket supplement 
reports a chan&"e as follows, " . . . the 
modern rule Is that a r:lght o! action 
does exist." 
3. 401 .Pa.. 267, 164 A . .2d 93 (1960) . 
4. Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 
Pa.. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940). 
6. Sinkler v. luteale, .t01 Pa. 2'67, 
270, 161 A. 2d. 93, 9·6 (1960) . 
6. Ill. at 269, IS( A. 2d at 95. 
7. Id. a t 270, 164. A . 2d at 96. 
8. 138 Mass. H~ 62 .Am.. Rep. 242 
(Sup. Jud. Ct. 18~4). 
9. See, e.g., Buel v. United Rys. Co. 
of St. Louis, 248 Mo. 126, 164 S.W. 71 
(191:l); Stemmer Y. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 
455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942). 
.10. Seez.. e.g. , Lipps v. Milwaukee 
El ctric K Y. and Light Co. , 164 Wis. 
27?, 169 N .W . 816 (19 16). 
11. Walker v. Great Northern Rv., 
28 L.R.Ir. 69 (Q.B. and Ex.Div. 1890). 
1.2. Allaire v St Luke's ];Iospital , 184 
Il l. 359, 66 N .E . 688 (1900). 
difficulty of proving proximate 
cause would open the door to 
purely speculative and fictitious 
claims. 
Dietrich Case 
Any discussion of the develop-
ment of the law on prenatal in-
juries must begin with Dietrich v. 
Inhabitants of Northampton.s This 
appears to be the first American or 
English case passing on the ques-
tion and it was consistently cited 
for over sixty years as authority 
for denying recovery to infants in-
jured before birth.9 There the 
court, through Mr. Justice Holmes, 
denied liability to the personal rep-
resentative of a child who died a 
few minutes after birth from pre-
natal injuries. The child was born 
prematurely four to five months fol-
lowing conception after its mother 
had fallen on a defective highway 
and miscarried. The decision rested 
on the complete lack of precedent 
and the concept that before birth 
a child is merely a part of his 
mother without separate existence 
or personality. The Dietrich case 
arose under a wrongful death stat-
ute and the child was probably 
non viable, but its holding has 
been broadened by later courts cit-
ing it as authority to deny re-
covery even where the child sur-
vives.10 
Irish Law 
The second important case on 
the subject was decided in Ireland 
in 1890.11 The case involved a com-
mon carrier and the court decided 
it on contract rather than tort law. 
The infant plaintiff was not al-
lowed to recover for prenatal 
mJuries because the defendant 
carrier had contracted only with 
the mother and not with the plain-
tiff. Thus the court avoided the 
separate entity question. 
The next recorded case on pre-
natal injuries was decided by the 
Illinois Supreme Court in 1900.12 
The infant plaintiff was injured 
ten days before birth by a projec-
tion from an elevator shaft when 
his mother was being transferred 
to another floor in the defendant 
hospital. Accepting Mr. Justice 
Holmes' view in the Dietrich case, 
the majority held that a child be-
fore birth was a part of its mother 
and was only severed from her at 
birth. In a strong dissent, rn Justice 
Boggs argued that a viable child 
Which could live separably from 
the mother had a cause of action, 
and that contrary to Holmes' con-
tention a precedent under common 
law was not necessary to establish 
the right. 
By this time there were sufficient 
precedents to establish the rule of 
no recovery. Between 1900 and 
1946 the highest courts in nine 
states considered the question of 
prenatal injuries under common 
law and all denied a cause of ac-
13. Itl. at 361, 56 N.E. at C40. 
;H . Gorman v . Bu.dlong, 23 R I 169 
49 All. 704. (19 01~ : Buel v. 'tinllea 
Rys. Co. of St. Lou.is, 24 Mo. l 26, 1;;4 
S .W. 71 (1913); Lipp~ , •. 1\Iilwaukee 
~J1ectr~c R_y. and tJght Co., 16 4 Wis. 
212, loO ?-; .W . 916 (1916.); Drol,1rler v. 
P eters, 232 N.Y: 2-20, 133 N.E. 567 
(1021) ; Stanford v. St. Louis-San 
Francisco R~· .. lll4 • la. GU, 108 -o. 
666 (1920); 'Magnolia Coca Cola Bot-
tll.Jlg Co. v. Jordan, 124 T ex. 34.7, 7S 
S.W. 2d 94'1 (193 5) ; .~ewman v . De-
t roit, 2S1 ~[icll. 80 , 2N N.W. 710 
.
< 1937) : tern.mer "'· 'Kline, 12s ~'.J.L. 
455, 20 A. 2d 4 9 (194.2) : B<rrlln v . 
J. C. Penney C o., Inc., 339 Pa. ci47, 
16 A. 2d 2S (]940). 
15. Scott ,·. i\:[cPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 
3d 620_ 92 P . 2d 678 (1939). 
16. cat. Ci,·. Code, § 29 (1941). 
17 . See, 6.!J., Stemmer v. Kline, 128 
presumed a child conceived, but 
not yet born, to be an existing per-
son to the extent necessary for 
protection of its interests in the 
event of its subsequent birth.16 
Frequently, lower courts in the 
other cases cited above would al-
low recovery, only to be reversed 
on appeal.17 A 1924 Pennsylvania 
lower court allowed recovery, but 
the decision was not appealed.18 
The case appears to have been nul-
lified by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court's later decision in Berlin v. 
J. C. Penney Co., lnc.19 Canada al-
lowed a cause of action as early 
as 1933;20 however, the decision 
did not have an immediate impact 
in the United States. 
The Restatement of Torts fol-
lowed the common law cases de-
cided before its adoption in 1939, 
and stated: "A person who negli-
gently causes harm to an unborn 
child is not liable to such child for 
the harm.'"' 
The turning point probably came 
in 1946 in the federal court case 
of Bonbrest v. Kotz, 22 where an 
action by a viable child for a pre-
natal injury was sustained based 
solely on the common law. How-
ever, the first American court of 
final jurisdiction to allow a com-
mon law recovery for injuries in-
curred before birth was Williams 
v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., in 
1949.23 Shortly afterward, Minne-
sota allowed the personal repre-
sentative of a stillborn child to 
bring an action for its wrongful 
death since it was viable at the 
time of the injury.24 
As the principal case points out, 
since 1949 seven states have over-
ruled former decisions denying re-
covery, · and nine ·states dealing 
with the question for the first time 
have upheld recovery. These are 
all cited in Sinkler v. Kneale to-
gether with the eight states that 
deny recovery.25 Four of the latter 
are described as strongly indicat-
ing that reversal is now likely, de-
pending on viability and other 
circumstances. 
The Pennsylvania Court in the 
Sinkler case was impressed by the 
fact that the four jurisdictions on 
which the Berlin case relied have 
all reversed themselves and at 
present uphold the right of action 
when the child is born alive.26 Thus 
with sufficient precedent for re-
versal and the current state of 
medical knowledge behind it, 
Pennsylvania became the most re-
cent state to allow recovery for in-
juries sustained before birth. 
N.J.L. i55, 26 A.2d 489 (194.2) ; :r,;'ew-
mMl v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60 , 274 ::-...,,.-. 
710 (1937). 
18. I0ne v. Zrlclce-rman, 4 Pa.D. & C. 
t77 (1924). 
19. l3erlln v. J . C. Penney Co., 339 
l'a. 5-17. l •A. 2d 2S ( 194-0) . 
20. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 
4 D.L.R, 337 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1933) . 
21 . ;Restatement, Torts §869 (19a9). 
22. 66 F .SUPTJ. 138 CD.D ... 1948). 
2S. 162 Ohio St. 11.1, 87 N.E. 2d 334 
(1949) . 
24. 'Verkennes v. Cornlea, 229 .:.\ilnn. 
365 0 38 N.W.2d 83 C1949}. 2~. 401 Pa. 267, 269, 164 A. 2d 03, 
95 (1960) . 
26. Wood~ , •. Lane t. 303 N'.Y. 349, 
102 N.E. 2.d 691 Cl9iil) ; • mann ,·. 
Faidy 415 Ill. 4.22. iH N .E. 2d 41& 
(1968); Smith v. 'Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 
157 A. 2d 497 (1960>. : and R e ves v. 
Constr\Jctlon Senioe, Inc., 165 N'.El 2d 
912 (Mass. 1960). 
27. 4.01 Pa. 267, 270, 164 A. 2d 93, 
96 (1960). 
28. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of 
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 
242 (Sup. Ind. Ct. 1884). 
29. See, e.g., Williams v. Marion 
:R.a,pld Tr-ansit, Inc., 11i2 OhlQ St. 11'1, 
S7 N.E. 2r.I 33'1 (19-19), B011b.resc v. 
;Kot;,;. t,5 F. Supp. 138 (D.U. , l 946). 
SO. Dorland, l)lustra ed Medical Dic-
tionary p. 50 (23d ed. 1957}. 
3 L Will Ill.ms ,·. l\[arion Rap.id Tran-
sit. Inc .. 152 OhJo St. 11-1. 'i ~.E. 2d 
334 094~). 
32. Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile 
Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W. 2d 
163 (1959). 
33. Sinkler v. KneaJe, •IOI Pa. 267, 
272, 164 A.. 2d 9!1, 9 (1960) . 
34. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 
157 A . 2d 497 (19:60) . 
The position of the courts before 
1946 is summarized in the dissent-
ing opinion of Sinkler v. Kneale.21 
Basically, the reasoning behind the 
no cause of action rule originated 
by Justice Holmes was that a child 
en ventre sa mere was not a sepa-
rate person, but was a part of the 
mother. One could owe no duty to 
a person not legally in existence 
nor to one whose presence was not 
readily foreseeable. Any injury to 
the unborn child which was not too 
remote to be recovered for at all 
was recoverable by the mother.2s 
As a practical matter the courts 
considered the difficulty of proving 
causal connection between the neg-
ligence and the injury. They feared 
a multitude of fraudulent and ficti-
tious claims would result if recov-
ery were permitted. Furthermore, 
it might cause increased litigation 
and greater family discord because 
the logical extension was to allow 
the child to sue the mother and 
anyone else who caused injuries, 
directly or indirectly. Also, stare 
decisis influenced some judges who 
believed in the finality of the law 
on which people should be able to 
rely. To them this was a problem 
for the legislatures not the courts. 
Collectively these arguments were 
difficult to overcome. 
Recognition of a cause of action 
in prenatal injury cases developed 
step by step. The first cases allow-
ing recovery emphasized the fact 
that the child was viable at the 
time of the injury.29 A viable child 
is defined as a· fetus that has 
reached such a stage of develop-
ment that it can live outside of the 
uterus independently of the moth-
er.3o Usually this commences in 
the sixth or seventh month, but it 
may occur earlier. In the case of 
viability it was possible to over-
come the argument that the child 
was not a separate entity. This was 
dramatically illustrated in Williams 
v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., where 
the mother died and the injured 
viable child taken from her sur-
vived.31 It could not, therefore, be 
argued that this child was not a 
separate person at the time of the 
injury. 
Once the theoretical arguments 
were overcome, it was not too diffi-
cult for the courts to set aside the 
practical hindrances to recovery. 
The problem of proof is not unique 
to this area of tort law and does 
not justify the denial of a remedy. 
Advances in the field of medicine 
have lessened the uncertainty in 
proving causation. A strict appli-
cation of the rules of evidence 
should protect one from false and 
fraudulent claims. This was amply 
illustrated by a Wisconsin decision 
very similar to the principal case.32 
A child allegedly born Mongoloid 
as the result of an auto accident 
had been allowed to recover in the 
lower court, but the case was re-
versed on appeal because the court 
said there was not sufficient evi-
dence of causation. 
The answer to the argument that 
increased litigation would result is 
that if one has an actionable right, 
a court should be available to grant 
a remedy. Justice Bell's apprehen-
sion of greater family discord 33 is 
35. Reyes v. Construction Ser,1ce, 
Inc., 166 N.E. 2d 91.2 (ll~ss. 1960). 
30. Taylor . Liab.t.ity for NegHg nt 
bci,w·v to p,.e u,~born, 36 D!cta 323, 
325 (11159). 
37. Ibid. 
38. ee, o . .,,.., Comment, 5 St. Louis 
U.L.J. 151 (105S). 
39. Yerkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 
365, 38 r'.W. 2d 838 (1949). 
40. 63 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (19-19} and 
34 l\linn. L. '.Rev. 66 (1949). 
4L Wendt v. Lillo, l 2 F. Supp. 56, 
62 (N.D. Iowa 1960). 
42. Musohetti v . Charles Pflzer & 
Co .. 144 N.)'.". l!d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1955); 
Norman v. Murphy, 268 P.2d 178 (Cal. 
Ct . .App. 1964) . 
43. Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 
684 (]968) . 
not a likely result. As a practical 
matter a child does not usually 
sue its parents. 
Neither is stare decisis a bar to 
recovery in those states which have 
previously considered the question. 
This principle applies mainly to de-
cisions which invite reliance such 
as in the fields of contract and 
property law where people are 
more likely to order their affairs 
based on existing law. One who is 
negligent has no right to argue 
that he acted in reliance on a rule 
barring recovery for prenatal in-
juries. "The law of negligence is 
primarily common law, whose great 
virtue is its adaptability to the 
conditions and needs of changing 
times." 34 As stated by Justice Wil-
liams in reversing Justice Holmes: 
"Although [the] doctrine [of 
stare decisis] is salutary it may be 
more important in a given case 
that the court be right, in the light 
of later examination of authorities, 
wider and more thorough discus-
sion and reflection upon the policy 
of the law, than that it adhere to 
previous decisions." 35 
It was an inevitable result that 
recovery would be extended to the 
nonviable fetus once the viable 
theory had become sufficiently 
entrenched. There was no justifi-
able distinction between the two as 
far as the injured child was con-
cerned. He had a right to enter 
the world with a sound body re-
gardless of when the injury oc-
curred. 
Any denial of recovery because 
of nonviability is arbitrary and un-
fair. Medical science recognizes 
that the embryo becomes a sepa-
rate being from the time of con-
ception. This view is found in 
current oaths of doctors. The per-
tinent sentence in the Geneva ver· 
sion of the Hippocratic Oath as 
adopted by the World Medical As-
sociation compnsmg thirty-nine 
national medical societies includ-
ing the American Medical Associa-
tion reads, "I will maintain the 
utmost respect for human life from 
the time of its conception." 36 The 
International Code of Medical Eth-
ics in defining a doctor's duty 
states, "A doctor must always be.ar 
in mind the importance of preserv-
ing human life from tlie time of 
conception until death.'' 37 
Rights Upheld 
The law with respect to property, 
inheritance and criminal law rec-
ognizes one's rights from the time 
of conception. Those who argue 
for eliminating the viability dis-
tinction say it is illogical not to 
afford the same protection to un-
born children in the field of tort 
law.as 
Perhaps the distinction between 
viable and nonviable fetuses is 
more an illusion in the eyes of 
judges and writers on the subject 
than it is real. Judges who write 
the decisions emphasize they are 
allowing recovery because the child 
was viable 39 and note writers crit-
icize them for being too narrow-
minded.40 Yet no jurisdiction which 
has allowed recovery to a viable 
fetus who survived has later denied 
recovery to a child who survived 
an injury suffered before it was 
viable. If the language of the cases 
limiting recovery to the viable 
(Continued On Page 6) 
44. Terkennes v. Cornieal Z29 Minn. 
365, 38 N.W. 2d 838 (194-9 J . 
45. Wend v. Lillo, .1S2 F. Supp. 56, 
62 (N.D. Iowa 19BOt 
29. E.g., RJce ,.. Sante Fe E levator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 21 (1947. 
30. E ,fl., Schwartz. Tiu; Suprr.mtJ 
Court - Octob r 19if9 Term. 59 Mich. 
L. Rev. 403, 420 (1961). 
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This case, decided in 1937, ap-
The knotty: problem of determin-
ing the extent to which state police 
power 1 is curtailed by the federal 
constitution• in matters affecting 
interstate carriers is the subject 
of numerous Supreme Court deci-
sions, the latest of which is Huron 
Portland Cement Co. v. City of De-
troit.3 This case involved the con-
stitutionality of the Detroit Smoke 
Abatement Code4 as applied to 
ships federally licensed to operate 
in interstate commerce on the 
Great Lakes. 
The ships were owned and 
operated by the Cement Co. for the 
purpose of transporting cement 
produced at its mill in Michigan to 
ports in the various states border-
ing on the Great Lakes. While two 
of these ships were docked at De· 
troit, it was found necessary to 
keep their boilers fired so that 
deck machinery could be operated. 
This required periodic cleaning of 
the fires causing the emission of 
smoke which exceeded the maxi-
mum allowable under the ordi-
nance. 
In the state circuit court, the 
Cement Co. sought to enjoin crimi-
nal proceedings for a violation of 
the ordinance instituted against it 
in the Detroit Recorder's Court. 
The Michigan Supreme Court af-
firmed 5 the circuit court's refusal 
to grant relief, and as a result an 
appeal was carried to the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Speaking for the majority, Mr. 
Justice Stewart upheld the decision 
of the Michigan court and declared 
that the ordinance is a valid local 
regulation. In rejecting the Cement 
Co.'s contention that the federal in-
specting and licensing legislation 6 
was preemptive and that the city 
ordinance, "materially affects inter-
state commerce in matters where 
uniformity is necessary," he said 
that the ordinance is an "even-
handed" exercise of the state's 
police power in promoting the 
health and welfare of the city's 
residents and was neither discrimi-
natory nor unduly burdensome on 
interstate commerce. It was further 
stated that the ordinance, fairly 
interpreted, is not in conflict with 
the federal statute which indicates 
a congressional intent to occupy 
only a limited field. The majority 
also felt that the local regulation 
in this case was not lacking in uni-
formity, because there was no 
showing that other conflicting reg-
ulations actually existed. 
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the 
dissenting opinion in which Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter concurred. He 
pointed out that the ordinance pro-
vided for the sealing of shirs which 
failed to meet the standards estab-
lished by it even though the same 
equipment had been federally li-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. X, "The pow-
ers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the Sta.tes. are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people." 
With respec.t ,to Inter~! :u comm,erce, the 
states may 'in some Instances constitu-
tionally pass laws to protect the safety, 
health, and welfare of their citizens 
under thrs amendment. Wilson v. Black 
Bird Creek Marsh Co. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
245 ( 1829) is an early example. 
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, "The 
Congress shall have Power ... To 
regulate commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States 
and with the Indian Tribes ; . . ." ' 
3. 362 : U .S. 440 (1960). 
4. Detroit, Mich., Ordinance No. 167 
-E. 
5. 355 Mich. 227, 93 N.W. 2d 888 
(1959). 
6. REv. STAT. Secs. 417-19 (1875), as 
censed to operate in interstate com-
merce. 7 He felt that this provision, 
combined with that providing for 
criminal prosecution of the ship 
owners, obstructed the free use of 
a license granted under an act of 
Congress and consequently should 
be struck down as unconstitutional. 
The dissenting opinion concluded 
by saying that the question of uni-
formity of regulation does not 
depend upon the existence of con-
trary regulations in other localities, 
but rather upon the subject matter, 
which in this case does not admit 
of varying local controls. 
The Court's approach to present 
day controversies involving local 
regulations of interstate commerce 
is based upon a foundation of its 
earlier leading decisions. The first 
of these was Gibbons v. Ogden.s 
In his now famous opinion, Mr. 
Chief Justice Marshall withdrew 
the meaning of "commerce," as 
used in the constitutional grant to 
Congress, from the depths of 
ambiguity. He reasoned that com-
merce encompasses activity in-
volving traffic and commercial 
intercourse, including the instru-
mentalities and agencies which 
give it life. Marshall said that fed-
eral power to regulate commerce 
need not stop at fhe boundary line 
of a state, but may be introduced 
into its interior if it also affects 
activity in other states.9 
About five years later, when 
faced with an attempt by a state to 
regulate navigable waters, Marshall 
held, with a majority of the Court, 
that where a state is properly ex-
ercising its police power to protect 
the health and welfare of its resi-
dents, and where there is no con-
flict with federal legislation, there 
is no reason to view the commerce 
clause as being violated.IO 
Cooley Case 
In another leading case, decided 
in 1851, Cooley v. Board of War-
dens of Philadelphia,11 the Court 
was asked to determine the validity 
of a Pennsylvania statute requiring 
the use of pilots on ships entering 
and leaving Philadelphia's harbor, 
there being at the same time an 
act of Congress specifically dele-
gating control of pilotage to the 
states. In his majority opinion, Mr. 
Justice Curtis said that the mere 
grant to Congress of the power to 
regulate commerce did not deprive 
the states of all their legislative 
prerogative in this field. He pointed 
out that many aspects of interstate 
commerce do not require the ex-
clusive regulation of Congress, but 
on the contrary, may be best 
served by state regulation. The 
basis of this decision was the 
Court's realization that the state 
amended. 46 U.S.C. secs. 390-93 
(1958). 
7. 362 U.S. at 450-51. 
8. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
There it was held that a New York 
legislative license to Ogden violated 
the commerce clause in granting him 
exclusive rights to operate steamboats 
between New York City and various 
places in New Jersey; Gibbons held 
a federal license to operate between 
the same places. 
9. Id. at 197. 
10. Wilson v. Black Bird Creek 
Marsh Co. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) H5 (1829) . 
A D el&ware statute a u t.hori:i:ing the 
construction of a dam. acroets a navi-
gable stream was sustained as a means 
of enhancing the adjacent land values 
and of providing a more healthful en-
vironment for the residents of the 
area. By way of dictum, Marshall said 
that had Congress occupied the field 
the Court would not hesitate to hold 
the Delaware act void. 
11. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
proved a Washington statute re-
quiring the inspection of the hull 
and machinery of tug boats operat-
ing in interstate commerce along 
the Pacific Coast, its purpose being 
to insure safety and to determine 
seaworthiness. Since the federal 
ships 13 do not apply to tug boats, 
laws relating to the inspection of 
the Court found no conflict. It was 
held that a vessel which is actually 
unsafe is not a subject protected 
by the principle requiring uni-
formity of regulation. Mr. Chief 
Justice Hughes stated that there is 
nothing in the Constitution requir-
ing Congress to enact legislation 
which would occupy the whole field 
of the subject matter being regu-
lated. On the contrary, Congress 
may regulate only a limited field, 
and when it does so, state regula-
tion outside its coverage is not for0 
bidden or displaced, if otherwise 
admissible. He emphasized that a 
proper exercise of the state's police 
power is superseded only where 
the conflict with existing federal 
legislation is so direct and positive 
that the two acts cannot be recon-
ciled.14 In conclusion, however, he 
said that if the state attempted to 
impose standards relating to struc-
ture, design, equipment or opera-
tion which go beyond what is 
essential to safety, it would have 
encountered the principle that such 
requirements must be established 
through the action of Congress in 
declaring a uniform rule.15 
The fact that the Detroit ordi-
nance in Huron did not require 
structural alterations to the ships 
is significant, because if it had, the 
Court need only turn to a case it 
decided in 1959 for a recent prece-
dent pointing the way. Bibb v. 
Navajo Freight Lines, lnc.16 There, 
an Illinois statute requiring the use 
of contour mudguards on trucks 
was declared invalid, because its 
effect was to make illegal in Illi-
nois the use of conventional mud-
guards allowed in almost all the 
other states and required in Arkan-
sas. Since the necessity of welding 
contour mudguards to trucks com-
ing from Arkansas would make 
rapid changeover impossible, and 
since there was evidence that this 
type of mudguard did nothing to 
promote safety, Mr. Justice Doug-
las, with whom seven members of 
the Court joined, felt that the Illi-
nois law violated the commerce 
clause, because the diffculity of 
compliance and the conflict with 
the preexisting Arkansas statute 
would impose serious burdens on 
interstate truckers. Although Ar-
kansas required conventional mud-
guards, in so doing, it nevertheless 
conformed to a uniform practice 
throughout the nation. 
The dissenting justice in Huron 
leaned heavily on Napier v. Atlan-
tic Coast Line Railroad Co.17 as 
authority for their contention that 
there was a collision of local and 
federal law. In the Napier case one 
state required the installation of 
automatic fire doors on locomotives 
pulling interstate trains and an-
other state required the use of cab 
curtains during the winter time. 
The Boiler Inspection Act 1s gave 
the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion authority to specify the kinds 
12. 302 U.S. 1 (1937). 
13. 36 Stat. 462 (1910) . 
14. 302 U.S. at 10. 
15. Id. at 15. 
16. 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
17. 272 U.S. 605 (1926) . 
of equipment to be used on loco-
motives, but the Commission had 
never issued regulations pertaining 
to these particular items. In strik-
ing down the state ·laws involved, 
the Court said, through Mr. Justice 
Brandeis, that the federal act pre-
cluded state legislation because it 
was intended to occupy the whole 
field, and the fact that the Com-
m1Ss1on had not exercised its 
powers to specify the type of 
equipment to be used made no dif-
ference.19 
In comparing Huron to Napier, 
Mr. Justice Douglas thought that a 
close analogy could be drawn. 
Neither dealt with an inspection 
statute as did the Kelly case. Both 
involved a federal agency which 
could promulgate rules as to the 
type of equipment required, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission 
in Napier and the Coast Guard in 
Huron. Notice, however, that the 
local legislation in Napier required 
the installation of special equip-
ment as did the Bibb case, while 
in Huron it did not. Is this not sig-
nificant from the standpoint of the 
burden cast upon interstate com-
merce? 
A case which has greater s1mi· 
larity to Huron in its reasoning is 
South Carolina State Highway 
Dep't. v. Barnwell Bros., lnc.20 In 
upholding the validity of a South 
Carolina statute restricting the 
weight and width of motor vehicles 
using its highways, the Court said 
that although the commerce clause 
has been held of its own force to 
curtail state power to regulate in-
terstate commerce in some meas-
ure, it did not forestall all state 
action affecting commerce. There 
are matters of local concern, the 
regulation of which affects inter-
state commerce but which, because 
of their local character and their 
number and diversity, may never 
be acted upon by Congress. Not-
withstanding the commerce clause, 
the Court held that regulations of 
the type involved in this case 
should be left to the states in the 
absence of congressional action. 
In contrasting the Bibb and 
South Carolina Highway cases, if 
one looks to the changing circum-
stances of interstate highway trans-
portation between 1938, the year of 
the South Carolina Highway deci-
sion, and 1959, the year of the Bibb 
decision, at least part of the under-
lying reason for the Court's seeming 
change in attitude becomes ap-
parent. Since the trucking industry 
has emerged over the years as a 
means of carriage comparable with 
the railroads in national impor-
tance, it appears that the former 
hesitancy of the Court to disturb 
the states' police powers in regu-
lating the use of their highways 
has become somewhat dispelled in 
the balancing of local and national 
interests. Interference by the states 
has a more substantial effect on 
interstate highway transportation 
now than twenty-five years ago. In 
1954, this changed attitude began 
to take shape when the Court held 
that the exclusion of an interstate 
trucking firm from the highways of 
Illinois conflicted with the intent 
of Congress as expressed in the 
Motor Carrier Act,21 even though 
the purpose of the state statute 
was to punish the firm for violating 
Illinois highway regulations.22 Per-
haps it would be proper to con-
clude that in these later highway 
cases, the Court is placing greater 
emphasis on the extent to which 
18. 43 Stat. 659 (1924), 35 U.S.C. 
Sec. 23 (1958). 
19. 272 U.S. at 613. 
20. 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
21. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. 
Secs. 301-27 (1958) . 
22. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 
Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954). 
interstate commerce is burdened 
and the susceptibility of the prob-
lem to congressional control. There 
seems to be an increasing concern 
with the difficulty interstate high-
way carriers have in conforming to 
the challenged state regulations. It 
is doubtful that the Court today 
would reason as it did in Sporles v. 
Binford,23 where it said that when 
the subject of the regulation lies 
within the police power of the 
state, ". . . debatable questions as 
to reasonableness are not for the 
courts but for the legislature, 
. . . and its action within its range 
of discretion cannot be set aside 
because compliance is burden-
some ... .'' 24 
The earlier cases apparently 
based their decisions more on 
whether or not interstate commerce 
was discriminated against than on 
principles of uniformity or the ex-
tent to which it was burdened.25 
If confronted with these same cases 
today it is questionable whether 
the Court would be so inclined to 
uphold these state laws if it felt 
that they were really an unreason-
able burden and set up standards 
which did not conform with those 
existing in the rest of the nation. 
This theory is substantiated by 
Morgan v. Virginia 26 where the 
Court held invalid a Virginia stat-
ute requiring the segregation of 
white and colored passengers on 
interstate as well as intrastate car-
riers. All but one of the justices 
took the position that the state 
legislation violates the commerce 
clause when it unduly burdens in-
terstate commerce in matters 
where uniformity is necessary. The 
Court recognized that the uniformi-
ty principle lacked precision and 
said that in its application it 
should be viewed in the light of the 
particular facts involved in each 
case. 
Review 
In reviewing the cases within 
the scope of this comment, one 
soon finds that when Congress has 
remained inactive, the Court is 
placed in the position of having to 
arbitrate the competing demands 
of state and national interests. 
While attempts have been made 
from time to time to work with 
mechanistic formulae and thus 
avoid judging,21 they have ended 
in failure. The trend of the Court's 
recent thinking is well exemplified 
by Southern Pacific Co. v. Ari-
zona.2s An Arizona statute made it 
unlawful to operate a train of 
more than fourteen passenger or 
seventy freight cars. In 1941, the 
state sought to recover statutory 
penalties for violations of the stat-
ute, and the state supreme court 
upheld the act as a valid safety 
measure designed to reduce the 
number of accidents. Speaking 
through Mr. Chief Justice Stone, 
the Court reversed the state court 
and outlined various steps to facili-
tate the formation of a sound basis 
upon which judgment could be 
entered. First, any asserted viola-
tion of the commerce clause must 
be supported by relevant factual 
information which will afford a 
firm footing for an enlightened 
(Continued On Page 5) 
23. 286 U .S. 374 (1932) . 
24. Id. at 388-89. 
2~. An exam.J)le of this philosophy i.s 
Moms v. Durby, 27~ U.S. 135 (192-G), 
w here it wai. safd , "In the absence of 
national legisl ation e5pec.ially covering 
the subject of lnterstat~ commerce, th 
S LnLe ma1· r ightly prescribe uniform 
regula.tlons adopted to promote safety 
upon its .hlghway and the <ions rvat:!on 
of theb- ul;e, appllca.b le alike to -vehi-
cles moving in interstate commerce 
and those of its own citizens." 
26. 328 U.S. 373 (1946). 
27. E.g., original package doctrine 
of Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 419 (1827). 
28. 325 U .S. 761 (1945). 
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NewFacultyMembers Professional Responsibility 
Course Expands Schedule William Mitchell has six new 
faculty members this year who 
bring to the school a variety of 
backgrounds in education and ex-
perience. 
Jeanette J. Bluhm was born 
in Bertha, Minnesota. She gradu-
ated magna cum laude from Ham-
line University receiving her B.A. 
degree and received an M.A. degree 
from the University of Minnesota. 
She th en at-
t ended Yale 
University Law 
School and grad-
uated with a "B" 
average. Miss 
Bluhm practiced 
law for 12 years 
in New York 




J. J. Bluhm 
erts. She then attented Columbia 
University Law School, received 
her LL.M. with an A- average. She 
also attended the Parker School of 
Foreign & Comparative Law at 
Columbia University. She taught 
high school English in Connecti-
cut, and has served with the Civil 
Aeronautics Board in Washington. 
She is teaching Introduction to 
Law this semester and will teach 
Conflict of Laws next semester. 
Charles Gordon is teaching 
Administrative Law this year. Mr. 
Gordon is the Regional Counsel in 
an area of 16 states for the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service 
of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
He graduated from New York Uni-
versity Law School and attended 
City College of New York. He is 
co-author of the outstanding work 
on immigration, "Immigration Law 
and Procedure" by Gordon and 
Rosenfield. He is the author of an 
article in the current issue of the 
Minnesota Law Review on "Right 
to Counsel In Immigration Pro-
ceedings." 
Roger W. Schnobrich is shar-
ing with Mr. William J. Erickson 
the course in Legal Accounting. 
Mr. Schnobrich graduated in 1952 
from the University of Minnesota, 
where he received his B.B.S., and 
in 1954 from the University of 
Minnesota Law School. He is a 
member of the Order of the Coif 
and is a partner in the law firm of 
Erickson, Popham, Haik and Schno-
brich. 
Dr. Raymond B. Van der Borght 
was born in Belgium and received 
the degrees of Doctor of Philoso-
phy and Doctor of Jurisprudence 
from the University of Louvain. He 
practiced law in Brussels for 
twenty-five years. For the last ten 
years he has lived in St. Paul, 
where he is International Opera-
tions Consultant to the General 
Counsel of Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing Company. Last win-
ter he lectured in the Institute on 
Investments and Business Abroad 
given at William Mitchell. He will 
teach a course in Comparative Law 
during the second semester which 
will cover the great legal systems 
of the world and their judicial or-
ganizations. The principles of con-
tracts, torts, negligence and sales 
under the various systems will be 
compared. 
David L. White is now teach 
Labor Law. Mr. White is engaged 
in general practice with the firm of 
Faricy, Moore, Costello and Hart. 
He received his undergraduate de-
D. L. White Van der Borght 
gree magna cum laude from Ohio 
University where he was president 
of the student body and Phi Beta 
Kappa. He was graduated from Har-
vard Law School. 
Paul G. Zerby is associated 
with Mr. Robert J. Johnson in 
teaching Income Taxation. Mr. 
Zerby attended the University of 
Minnesota, where he received his 
B.A. in Economics and was gradu-
ated from Harvard Law School, 
after which he clerked for Chief 
Justice Peter Woodbury of the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals. Last 
year he was one of the lecturers at 
William Mitchell's Institute on In-
vestments and Business Abroad. 
Mr. Zerby practices law with the 
firm of Dorsey, Owen, Barber, Mar-
quart and Windhorst. 
Hon. Douglas K. Amdahl will re-
turn to William Mitchell as an 
active faculty member in the sec-
D. K. Amdahl P. G. Zerby 
ond semester. Judge Amdahl, who 
is an alumnus of our school of the 
class of '51, taught here for several 
years, but found himself too busy 
to continue two years ago. He was 
given a leave of absence on his 
promise to resume his teaching 
duties in the near future. He is 
keeping his promise and will in-
struct the course in Business Asso-
ciations in the next semester. 
By Kenneth Mitchell 
Students entering their fourth 
and, hopefully, final year at Wil-
liam Mitchell are finding a reor-
ganized two credit course on Pro-
fessional Responsibility added to 
the curriculum. 
The course implements the can-
ons of legal ethics originally for-
mulated by the American Bar As-
sociation and now familiar to every 
lawyer. While the original pro-
nouncements served for many 
years, the extension of a lawyer's 
activities and duties led to several 
supplemental studies, with broader 
and more definitive reports. 
The impelling purpose of the 
course is to bring to the attention 
of students, before they become 
lawyers, some of the situations 
they will encounter in their pro-
fessional practice which involve 
problems of professional conduct. 
This course seeks to make the stu-
dents aware that there are hazards 
in the practice of law and they 
must be alert to watch for these 
hazards and avoid stumbling into 
them. If there is any novelty in 
William Mitchell's approach to this 
troublesome area of legal educa-
tion, about which the law schools, 
lawyers, and the courts have been 
concerned for many years, it is the 
comprehensiveness with which this 
covers so many types of situations 
in practice and so many problems 
of professional responsibility. 
The course might almost be 
called a practical demonstration on 
how to build a reputation and keep 
it. Nor is reputation always a gran-
doise idea. It is sometimes founded 
on a series of little impressions 
that build respect, as evidenced by 
Mr. William H. Oppenheimer's 
series or practice tidbits under the 
title of "Law Office Management". 
This seemingly colorless topic be-
came meaningful with the revela-
tion of this speaker's high sense 
of duty to his clients and the 
meticulous care with which he pro-
tects his own reputation as a 
lawyer. 
If the course benefits the indi-
vidual students, it also benefits the 
profession as a whole. It takes only 
a passing familiarity with the head-
lines of some of the major news-
papers to learn of members of the 
bar who are charged with violat-
ing their professional responsibili-
ties. Whether the charges are 
proven or not is immaterial to this 
subject; the fact is that a · lawyer's 
transgressions are page one news, 
which can and does affect the pub-
lic's trust and the lawyer's in-
come. 
Last year's experience resulted 
in some strengthening of the 
course for the current year. The 
discussion of special problems in 
divorce practice was expanded by 
adding to Judge Theodore B. Knud-
son's exposition of the Family 
Court of Hennepin County a talk 
by Mr. Richard E. Kyle on the 
problems encountered in actual 
divorce trials. More time has been 
allotted for the lectures on prob-
lems in probate practice by Mr. 
David R. Brink, the relations be-
tween lawyers and physicians by 
Mr. Charles R. Murnane, and rela-
tions between lawyers and real es-
tate and insurance men by Mr. 
Fred A. Kueppers, Sr. 
A new speaker, Mr. Erwin Mitch 
Goldstein, will discuss relations of 
lawyers with accountants, and the 
problems a lawyer in general prac-
tice has when dealing with a law-
yer who is a specialist in a limited 
field. 
At the end of last year's course 
the members of the class were 
asked to write their comments and 
suggestions for the improvement 
of the course. A few came up with 
the idea that, while it is all right 
for "these $50,000 per year speak-
ers" to tell us how they act in cer-
tain situations, how about having 
a young lawyer who is not yet 
making that kind of money tell us 
what he does in some of those 
forbidding situations? The Commit-
tee on Professional Responsibility 
liked the idea and selected as the 
speaker, although with some trepi-
dation that it might not be meet-
ing the financial stipulations of the 
suggestion, Mr. William J. Erick-
son, who will address the last ses-
sion of the course on the subject, 
"Problems of Professional Respon-
sibility as Viewed by the Young 
Lawyer". 
(Continued From Page 4) 
judgment. Second, the mere legis-
lative recital that the statute is a 
safety measure does not bind the 
Court; it must analyze the effect of 
the statute and make a determina-
tion for itself. Third, even if the 
Court deems it a safety measure, it 
must look at the total result and 
decide whether it is outweighed by 
the national interest to keep inter-
state commerce free from nonuni-
form local interferences. 
Notwithstanding the Court's ex-
pressed desire in the Southern 
Pacific case to judge each fact situ-
ation on an individual basis, it has 
subsequently tended to look at the 
matter with an eye to tradition.29 
If the matter is one about which 
Congress has historically legislated, 
such as railroads as opposed to 
highways, the Court is more likely 
to hold that existing federal legis-
lation precludes state regulation. 
Of course, the apparent scope of 
the federal act is an important fac-
tor. The more it appears to be a 
complete system of regulation, the 
more likely it is that the state law 
will be declared superseded. 
Chairman Reports On Placement At William Mitchell 
Eminent students of constitution-
al law ao have found it difficult to 
reconcile the Court's reasoning in 
the Huron and Southern Pacific 
cases. In Southern Pacific, Mr. 
Chief Justice Stone said that if one 
state could regulate train lengths, 
so could all the others. The result 
would be that interstate railroads 
would have to conform to, "a crazy 
quilt of State laws." s1 It was his 
opinion that where national uni-
formity is necessary, no regulation 
at all is preferable to the confu-
sion and difficulty which would 
arise from a burdensome patch-
work of state legislation. It was the 
possibility, not the actuality, of "a 
crazy quilt" which led the Court to 
invalidate the Arizona statute. 
Once a person has "placed" him-
self in the legal profession, there 
inevitably comes a day when he 
must "place" himself in a job. It 
is on that day that the neophite 
lawyer should be aware of the 
numerous opportunities in the field 
of law, a field which ranges from 
adoption to zoning. 
A question is often asked, 
"Shouldn't any law student worth 
his salt be able to get his own 
job?" The answer is that the com-
petent law student in the vast ma-
jority of cases does procure em-
ployment within a relatively short 
By Edward Soshnik, Chairman 
time after completion of school. 
But in too many cases it is only 
a job, sometimes taken because 
of economic necessity, and once 
the novelty of the new adventure 
has passed, the young lawyer real-
izes that he has made a mistake. 
To avoid such a mistake, the law 
student should learn and be aware 
of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of choosing a law firm as a 
career, of practicing corporation 
law, of using his legal knowledge 
with a business enterprise, 
The Placement Bureau at Wil-
now in its fourth year of operation, 
and, while it is still in the forma-
tive stages, it has already proved 
to be of assistance to students and 
graduates. Many of the students 
are presently working and putting 
themselves through school in posi-
tions obtained through the Place-
ment Bureau. 
At present, it must be said that 
the Placement Bureau has not yet 
reached the level of the model 
placement program previously 
mentioned, but the program is 
young and eager and indications 
are that it will soon take a back 
liam Mitchell College of Law is seat to none in the placement field . 
The apparent inconsistency be-
tween Huron and Southern Pacific 
may in part be reconciled by com-
paring the modes of transportation 
involved in each case. In distin-
guishing the South Carolina High-




Fairness ... . Frank J. Hammond 
Special Problems in Criminal 
Practice ... Judge John W. Graff 
The Lawyer as a Fiduci-
ary ... . Judge Oscar R. Knutson 
Justice for the Poor .... . Professor 
Maynrad E. Pirsig, U. of Minn. 
Law School 
Conflicting Inter-
ests . .. ..... .... John G. Dorsey 
Special Problems in Probate 
Practice ........ David R. Brink 
Problems in Family Law 
Judge Theodore B. Knudson 
Special Problems in Divorce 
Practice .... . . Richard E. Kyle 
Advertising and Solicita-
tion . ......... Robert F. Henson 
The Lawyer and His Profes-
sion . . . ... .. .. .. Philip Neville 
Law Office Manage-
ment. . William H. Oppenteimer 
Relations Between Lawyers and 
Physicians . . Charles R. Murnane 
Corporate 
Counsel. .. , Fordyce W. Crouch 
Relations Between Lawyers and 
Real Estate and Insurance 
Men ... . . Fred A. Kueppers, Sr. 
Relations Between Lawyers and 
Accountants . . . . . . Erwin Mitch 
Goldstein 
The General Practioners' Problems 
In Dealing with Lawyer Special-
ists . . . . .. .. . Mr. Goldstein 
Special Problems in Trial 
Tactics ......... Philip Stringer 
Special Problems in Tax Prac-
tice ..... . . .. . Hayner N. Larson 
Problems of Professional Respon-
sibility as Viewed by the Young 
Lawyer . ... William J. Erickson 
Mr. Chief Justice Stone noted that 
the cases involving state limitations 
on motor vehicle size and weight 
have an added element not present 
in the railroad cases. That element 
is the use of highways furnished 
and maintained by the state.s2 This 
appears to be sufficient to tip the 
scales in favor of state regulatory 
power. The attitude of the Court 
could well be that more extensive 
state control is permissible where 
the regulation has a direct relation 
to the cost of maintaining state 
owned transportation facilities as 
well as to the safety of the public. 
It is quite possible tl;tat the same 
approach was adopted by ri1r. Jus-
tice Stewart in analyzing the .effects 
of the Detroit Smoke Abatement 
Code on ships using the ''city's. har-
bor, a situation similar to that of 
the harbor pilots in . the C~oley 
case. The health of th.e. !!ity'.s : resi-
dents is a subject peculiarly of 
local concern, and, as . all obJectl.~e 
of local regulation, it appe~rS:: to 
outweigh national uniformity more 
than other measures .. with.: less 
laudable judicially defined pur-
poses. · 
As indicated above, the p\.irpose 
of the state regulation, as con-
strued by the Court is of prime 
importance in'. determining · its 
validity. Wh~re the promotion of 
safety, for example, was a mere 
incident of denying an iiiterstate 
carrier the right to operate in a 
manner most advantageous to it, 
the real purpose being to prevent 
competition, the Court found little 
difficulty in holding such state ac-
tion unconstitutional. Buck v. Kuy-
kendalf.33 On the other hand, in 
Bradley v. Pub. Util. Comm'sn. of 
Ohio,34 the Court upheld an order 
denying an interstate carrier a 
certificate to operate over a con-
gested state highway on the ground 
that it would be an undue hazard 
to the safety of the motoring pub-
lic. In distinguishing the Buck case, 
the Court noted that the test em-
ployed there was the adequacy of 
existing transportation facilities, 
whereas in the Bradley case the 
(Continued On Page 6) 
Page 8 WILLIAM MITCHELL OPINION December, 1961 
Fourth In Series - Know Your Trustees 
Judge Pearson Long Active 
As Trustee and Teacher 
The Honorable Albin S. Pearson 
was born on January 27, 1894 at 
Amery, Wisconsin, and is a grad-
uate of the academic and law de-
partments of the University of Min-
nesota. 
Judge Pearson's classmates at the 
University of Minnesota Law School 
included Stafford King, state audi-
tor, and John Dulebohn, professor 
at tl:e William Mitchell College of 
Law and formerly General Counsel 
of the Twin City Rapid Transit 
Company. 
After receiving his LL.B. degree 
in 1916, Judge Pearson engaged in 
general practice. He served as a 
field artillery officer in World War 
I, and in 1920 became the first dis-
trict commander of the Ramsey 
County American Legion. 
Judge Pearson was elected to the 
Minnesota Legislature in 1923, re-
elected in 1925, when he became 
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, and was a member of 
the 1926 State Crime Commission. 
In 1930, he was appointed Ramsey 
County Probate Judge . 
In 1931, he and five other Minne-
sota attorneys undertook the re-
vision of the Minnesota Probate 
Code. This code, somewl:at revised 
in 1889, had remained virtually un-
changed since it was originally en-
acted by the Minnesota Legislature 
in 1858. A careful study of the 
existing probate code and judicial 
decisions subsequent to 1849 was 
made. In 1934, the 200 sections of 
the proposed probate code were 
finished. After receiving the en-
dorsement of the Minnesota State 
Bar Association, the new code was 
presented to the Minnesota Legis-
lature and was enacted into law in 
1935. It remains unchanged except 
for a few minor corrections made 
in 1939. 
Appointed Ramsey County Dis-
trict Judge in 1939 after nine years 
in the Probate Court, Judge Pear-
son has served in this position for 
over 22 years. In addition to tis 
judicial duties, he served as an in-
structor in probate law at the St. 
Paul College of Law, and later at 
the William Mitchell College of 
Law. In 1960, he retired from the 
faculty after teaching probate law 
for 25 years. 
The judge was a trustee of the 
former St. Paul College of Law 
from 1939 to 1956 and he is pres-
ently a member of the Board of 
Trustees and Treasurer of the Wil-
liam Mitchell College of Law. 
Judge Pearson recently attended 
the 50th reunion of his l:igh school 
graduating class and the 45th re-
union of his law school graduating 
class. He has been a member of the 
St. Paul Athletic Club for over 40 
years and is presently serving as 
Vice President. Judge Pearson is 
married and has two sons and one 
daughter. 
Prenatal Injuries (Continued From Page 3) 
child be regarded as dicta, as it 
should, then the question remains 
open in most jurisdictions as to the 
fate of the nonviable child. 
The Sinkler case dismisses the 
viability issue by concluding that 
it has little to do with the basic 
right to recover and that the ques-
tion is primarily one of causation. 
Recovery under wrongful death 
statutes involves basically the same 
problems. In the words of Judge 
Graven: 
"The division of the courts 
doesn't turn on whether the infant 
did or did not live following birth, 
but on the broader question of 
whether recovery should be per-
mitted at all for prenatal injuries 
to a viable child. The writers and 
annotators in this field generally 
treat the cases permitting recovery 
for prenatal injury to a viable 
child in any situation as constitut-
ing one line of authority and those 
not in accord as constituting the 
other." u 
This conclusion follows from the 
purpose of the wrongful death stat-
utes which was to give the de-
cedent's representative the cause 
of action the deceased person could 
have maintained had he lived. 
However, at least two states which 
allow recovery for prenatal in-
juries when the child is born alive 
deny the cause of action when the 
child is born dead.42 One writer 
supports their view with the argu-
ment that unborn infants are sep-
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arate entities in the biological 
sense only.43 They become legal 
persons at birth and only then 
does the potential liability become 
complete. If they die before birth 
there would be no liability because 
there would have been no damage 
to a legal person. Under this view 
there is a wrong for which there 
would be no remedy. Would it be 
fair to allow a child who lived one 
hour to recover while the personal 
representative of the child who 
was born dead received nothing? 
This position probably results in 
an unnecessary distinction although 
it does avoid the causation problem 
in miscarriages. Under the re-
covery rule all miscarriages result 
in a potential liability in someone. 
Sinkler v. Kneale does not in-
volve a wrongful death statute, but 
the decision is probably broad 
enough to allow recovery in such 
a situation. 
The principal case together with 
Smith v. Brennan present as thor-
ough an examination of a subject 
as can be found in the cases on 
any subject. Sinkler does not add 
anything particularly new to the 
field of prenatal injuries, but it 
does reaffirm and add weight to 
the growing line of authorities al-
lowing recovery. 
In considering local law on the 
subject of prenatal injuries it 
must be recognized that Minnesota 
was the first jurisdiction to allow 
recovery for the wrongful death 
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taugl:t me that the lawyers who 
drive air-conditioned automobiles, 
play golf whenever the notion 
strikes them and live to sun-ripened 
old age, are those who can make 
correct decisions, reach the right 
answers to problems. This ability 
is the pay-dirt in the practice. 
Question Six: As I come to the 
bar from a good law school, am I 
prepared to practice? Answer: 
Probably not. Ours is the least 
proficient of all professions, I 
think, in craftsmanship. We come 
to tl:e bar pretty familiar with 
what certain selected courts have 
held in disputed and obscure mat-
ters in which we probably will have 
no actual concern at any time. We 
have learned what meaning har-
assed and perplexed judges have 
by force of necessity given to lan-
guage wholly without meaning, and 
how the courts have rescued de-
serving litigants out of the messes 
into wtich the errors of counsel 
have plunged them. In short, we 
are thoroughly conversant with the 
case books. But we are probably 
devoid of the tools of the practice, 
such as writing, speaking, investi-
gating facts or alleged facts, divin-
ing law in circumstances, the gentle 
arts of persuasion, the available 
protections against the pressures 
of controversy. 
Question Seven: Why be a law-
yer? Answer: The best reason is 
the joy brougtt by the daily strug-
gle with human problems, the sense 
of achievement, and of service. If 
you just want to make money, you 
better go into business. 
Question Eight: How should a 
lawyer fix his fees? Answer: I 
don't know, and I don't think any-
body else does. 
(Prenatal Injuries) 
of the child before birth.44 In Ver-
kennes v. Corniea an action was 
brought against the physician for 
injuries to a viable child during 
delivery which resulted in death. 
In allowing recovery the court em-
phasized the fact that the child was 
a viable person. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court has never decided 
a case involving a nonviable child, 
but in the light of additional prec-
edent and expanding medical 
knowledge it would probably agree 
with the Sinkler case today. 
Remaining for future cases to 
decide is the effect of contributory 
negligence by the mother on the 
right of the child to recover. To 
date this problem has not been 
considered. Perhaps it can be re-
solved in the same manner as 
passenger claims in auto accidents. 
Just as the contributory negligence 
of the driver does not prevent his 
passenger from recovering from the 
other driver, the child should not 
be precluded from bringing suit 
against the other party because the 
mother was also negligent. This 
may result in third party claims 
against the mother, but that does 
not directly concern the injured 
party. 
Another problem, not serious 
yet, is the effect of fallout from 
atomic tests on unborn babies. To 
what extent this will cause devel-
opmental defects and result in tort 
claims cannot be predicted. 
In conclusion it can be said that 
the development of the law of pre-
natal injuries truly portrays the 
flexibility of the common law with-
out the aid of statute. Here one 
finds the law proceeding with cau-
tion, yet keeping pace with chang-
ing and expanding medical knowl-
edge. As was stated by Judge 
Graven: 
"Seldom in the law has there 
been such an overwhelming trend 
in such a relatively short period of 
time as there has been in the trend 
toward allowing recovery for pre-
natal injuries to a viable infant." 45 
Alumni Briefs 
The Opinion is pleased to ac-
knowledge receipt from Chief 
Justice James T. Harrison of the 
Supreme Court of Montana, LL.B. 
1916, current news regarding some 
alumni in Montana. 
Associate Justice Albert H. 
Angstman, LL.B. 1912, has retired 
from the Montana Supreme Court 
on April 9, 1961 having served as 
an Associate Justice for some 28 
years, which is the longest period 
of service in the history of the 
Montana Supreme Court. 
District Judge Clifford E. Holt, 
LL.B. 1912, retired from the Dis-
trict Court Bench in 1960 after 
completing 24 years of service as a 
District Judge. 
Raymond J. Quinlivan, who grad-
uated from the St. Paul College of 
Law in 1922, died at his home in 
St. Cloud, Min-
nesota, on Octo-
ber 12. Mr. 
Quinlivan, who 
was born in 1894 
and was a grad-
uate of Carleton 
College, prac-
ticed law in St. 
Cloud from the 
time of his ad-
mission to the 
bar in 1922. He was City Attorney 
of St. Cloud for eight years. 
Mr. Quinlivan was well known 
throughout the state. He was a 
member of the Board of Regents 
of the University of Minnesota 
from 1935 until his deatt., and was 
Chairman of the Board for eleven 
years. As an alumnus he took an 
active interest in the affairs of the 
William Mitchell College of Law. 
State Police Power 
(Continued From Page 5) 
denial was to promote safety, and 
the test was the congestion of the 
highway. 
In conclusion, it may be said that 
under certain conditions, local gov-
ernments may regulate interstate 
carriers under the police powers 
reserved to the states and still be 
in conformity with the commerce 
clause of the federal constitution. 
The standards for testing the valid-
ity of such local control may be 
briefly stated as follows: 
1. Where there is direct conflict 
with an express regulation en-
acted by Congress acting within 
its province, the local act must 
give way.35 
2. Where Congress has occupied 
the field, local regulations occu-
pying the same field, whether 
directly or indirectly, must yield 
even though there is no conflict, 
unless Congress has otherwise 
provided.36 
3. Even where Congress has not 
acted, if the subject matter is of 
a national character requiring 
uniformity throughout the na-
tion, local action tending to 
hamper this objective is void.37 
4. Where interstate commerce 
would be unduly burdened or 
restrained by local control, the 
local legislation will be struck 
down as an obstruction to the 
free flow of commercial inter-
course between the states.38 
5. The motivating reasons under-
lying the local action will be 
scrutinized to determine whether 
or not its purpose is a valid ex-
ercise of the state's reserved 
powers.39 
Huron and its predecessors leave 
much to be desired in that the 
Court has not been consistent in its 
application of reasoning to fact. By 
drawing fine lines to distinguish 
the circumstances of cases leading 
(Prenatal Injuries) 
31. Tha 1erm used by Justice Frank-
furter In Morgan v. V ir g inia, 328 U .S. 
37 3, 388 (1946) . 
32. 225 U.S. a.t 783. 
33. 267 U.S. 307 (1925 ) . 
3 4. 289 U. S. 92 (1933 ) . 
35. E.g., Gibbons v . Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1 {1824). 
John A. Burns, 79, retired Dean 
of William Mitchell College of 
Law, passed away September 11, 
1961. 
Dean Burns received his ele-
mentary and high school education 
at Columbus, Wisconsin. He re-
ceived his LL.B. Degree from the 
St. Paul College of Law in 1904 
and in 1905 received his LL.M. De-
gree from tl:e University of Min-
nesota Law School. 
While attend-
ing the St. Paul 
College of Law 
he was instruc-
tor at · the West 
St. Paul High 
School, and su-
perintendent of 
sch o o 1 s. Mr. 
Burns practiced 
law as City At-
torney of West 
St. Paul. He was Assistant Corpora-
tion Counsel of the City of St. 
Paul for nine years. 
Dean Burns became a member 
of the St. Paul College of Law 
faculty in 1920 and was made 
Trustee in 1939 and appointed Sec-
retary to the Corporation in 1945 
and Vice President in 1949. He 
was appointed Dean in 1952 and 
remained in that capacity until his 
retirement in 1958. · 
He was a past President of the 
Ramsey County Bar Association 
and of tl:e Minnesota State Bar 
Association, and was a member of 
the American Bar Association. 
Rolf E. Dokmo, president of Bur-
dett-Smith company and a graduate 
of the St. Paul College of Law in 
1927, has passed away. 
Mr. Dokmo, in 
affiliation with 
West Publishing 




li am Mitchell 
along with other 
executives of 
the company. 
The affairs of 
Burdett-Smith Company are being 
caried on by James A. Rafftery, 
vice president and a 1951 graduate 
of William Mitchell. 
State Police Power 
to apparently incompatible conclu-
sions, the Court has left little in 
the way of precedents to guide the 
lower courts and local legislatures. 
As the different modes of inter-
state carriage change in their rela-
tive importance, there is little 
doubt that the ·court will view local 
regulations from varying perspec-
tives. The combination of these two 
factors makes it difficult to predict 
the direction future decisions will 
take, or, for that matter, to make 
an accurate judgment of the effect 
of Huron on local regulation of in-
terstate carriers other than the 
Detroit Smoke Abatement Code as 
applied to Great Lakes shipping. 
36. E .g., Napier v. Atlantic Coas:t 
Line Railroad co., 272 u.s. 605 (1926). 
37. E.g., Southern Paclfi.c Co. v. Arl-
zon,'l., 326 U.S. 7 61 (19 46). Casos hold-
ing that the state Tegulatioa was of a 
local chara,,ter not requiri ng -national 
unifonnlty Include; 1) Smltll v . Ala-
bama, 124 U.S. rn5 (1888). An Ala-
bama ·tatute r equiring an exam.inat!Oa 
·and license of train engineers be.fore 
opera.ting In the state. 2) Nashville. 
Chattanooga and t. Louis Railroad 
Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1 8 ) . 
Statute. reQu.iring an examination of 
rallroail. employees as to vision a.ad 
color blindn,ess. 3) New York, New 
Raven & Harttord Railroad Co. v. New 
York, 165 U.S . 628 (1 897) . New York 
statute forblading the use of furnaces 
or stoves i n paf!senger trains and Te-
quiring r· ard posts on railroad 
bridges. !l Erb. v. Mora.sch, 177 U.S. 
5 4 ( 1.900 . 1\Iunicipal ordinance limit-
ing the speed o! lra.lns In a city. 6) 
Atl11,ntic Coa.,,'1: Line Railroad Co. v. 
Georgi.a., 234 .s. !80 (1914) . Georgla. 
statute requiring Jectrlc hea.dHgbts on 
Joco:inotl.ves. 
38. B.fl., Kansas City Southern Rail-
road Co. ,·. Kaw Valley Drainage Dls-
trlct, 233 U .. - 5 (1914). Court held 
im·a.lid an ord. ·r requiring th ,:aUroa,d 
to remo-ve its bridges over a rlver for 
flood control purposes. 
89. E.fl., Bradl :i'" v. Public Utilities· 
Com.mlssion of Ohio, 289 U.S. 92 
(193 3) 
